IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/revint/v10y2015i1p23-41.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Shadow bureaucracies and the unilateral control of international secretariats: Insights from UN peacekeeping

Author

Listed:
  • Hylke Dijkstra

Abstract

While formal decision power in most international organizations rests with the member states, the member states often delegate the preparation of decisions to international secretariats. To prepare decisions, secretariats gather and analyze information and subsequently provide the member states with an assessment on the alternative courses of action. In this process, secretariats may accumulate an information surplus over the member states. They can use this advantage to suggest options close to their own interests. This article argues that, to counter such agency problem, the member states unilaterally invest in shadow bureaucracies with the aim to reduce informational asymmetries. Shadow bureaucracies are, however, costly. Member states have to weigh agency costs against the costs of domestic administrative capability. Strong states with outlier preferences are most likely to invest in shadow bureaucracies. They have most to gain. The use of shadow bureaucracies not only reduces agency costs. It also allows states more control over policy in international organizations. This article uses insights from peacekeeping in the United Nations to illustrate the argument. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Hylke Dijkstra, 2015. "Shadow bureaucracies and the unilateral control of international secretariats: Insights from UN peacekeeping," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 23-41, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:10:y:2015:i:1:p:23-41
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-014-9203-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11558-014-9203-7
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11558-014-9203-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Diana Panke, 2012. "Lobbying Institutional Key Players: How States Seek to Influence the European Commission, the Council Presidency and the European Parliament," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(1), pages 129-150, January.
    2. Roland Vaubel & Axel Dreher & Uğurlu Soylu, 2007. "Staff growth in international organizations: A principal-agent problem? An empirical analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 275-295, December.
    3. Morris Fiorina, 1982. "Legislative choice of regulatory forms: Legal process or administrative process?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 33-66, January.
    4. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    5. Robert G. Evans, 1974. "Supplier-Induced Demand: Some Empirical Evidence and Implications," International Economic Association Series, in: Mark Perlman (ed.), The Economics of Health and Medical Care, chapter 10, pages 162-173, Palgrave Macmillan.
    6. Devi Sridhar & Ngaire Woods, 2013. "Trojan Multilateralism: Global Cooperation in Health," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 4(4), pages 325-335, November.
    7. Pollack, Mark A., 2003. "The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199251179.
    8. Nielson, Daniel L. & Tierney, Michael J., 2003. "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 241-276, April.
    9. Pollack, Mark A., 1997. "Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 99-134, January.
    10. Michael Lipson, 2010. "Performance under ambiguity: International organization performance in UN peacekeeping," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 249-284, September.
    11. Roland Vaubel, 1986. "A public choice approach to international organization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(1), pages 39-57, January.
    12. Bendor, Jonathan & Taylor, Serge & Gaalen, Roland Van, 1985. "Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority: A Model of Deception and Monitoring in Budgeting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(4), pages 1041-1060, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jessica Di Salvatore & Magnus Lundgren & Kseniya Oksamytna & Hannah M. Smidt, 2022. "Introducing the Peacekeeping Mandates (PEMA) Dataset," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 66(4-5), pages 924-951, May.
    2. Klaus H. Goetz & Ronny Patz & Steffen Eckhard & Hylke Dijkstra, 2017. "Contested Implementation: The Unilateral Influence of Member States on Peacebuilding Policy in Kosovo," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 8, pages 102-112, August.
    3. repec:bla:glopol:v:8:y:2017:i:s5:p:102-112 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Klaus H. Goetz & Ronny Patz & Bernhard Reinsberg, 2017. "Trust Funds as a Lever of Influence at International Development Organizations," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 8, pages 85-95, August.
    5. Steffen Eckhard & Vytautas Jankauskas, 2020. "Explaining the political use of evaluation in international organizations," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 53(4), pages 667-695, December.
    6. Bernhard Reinsberg, 2017. "Organizational reform and the rise of trust funds: Lessons from the World Bank," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 199-226, June.
    7. repec:bla:glopol:v:8:y:2017:i:s5:p:85-95 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Parizek, Michal & Stephen, Matthew D., 2021. "The Increasing Representativeness of International Organizations’ Secretariats: Evidence from the United Nations System, 1997–2015," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 65(1), pages 197-209.
    9. Michal Parízek, 2017. "Control, soft information, and the politics of international organizations staffing," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 559-583, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:bla:glopol:v:8:y:2017:i:s5:p:102-112 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Klaus H. Goetz & Ronny Patz & Steffen Eckhard & Hylke Dijkstra, 2017. "Contested Implementation: The Unilateral Influence of Member States on Peacebuilding Policy in Kosovo," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 8, pages 102-112, August.
    3. Klaus H. Goetz & Ronny Patz & Bernhard Reinsberg, 2017. "Trust Funds as a Lever of Influence at International Development Organizations," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 8, pages 85-95, August.
    4. Michal Parízek, 2017. "Control, soft information, and the politics of international organizations staffing," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 559-583, December.
    5. Bernhard Reinsberg, 2017. "Organizational reform and the rise of trust funds: Lessons from the World Bank," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 199-226, June.
    6. repec:bla:glopol:v:8:y:2017:i:s5:p:85-95 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:47:y:2009:i::p:483-506 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Miltos Makris, 2003. "Administrative Bureaus with Standard Operating Procedures," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/062, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    9. Axel Dreher & Katharina Michaelowa, 2008. "The political economy of international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 331-334, December.
    10. repec:bla:glopol:v:8:y:2017:i:s5:p:15-25 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Klaus H. Goetz & Ronny Patz & Erin R. Graham, 2017. "Follow the Money: How Trends in Financing Are Changing Governance at International Organizations," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 8, pages 15-25, August.
    12. Vera Z. Eichenauer & Simon Hug, 2018. "The politics of special purpose trust funds," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 211-255, July.
    13. Thomas Doleys, 2009. "Incomplete Contracting, Commission Discretion and the Origins of EU Merger Control," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 483-506, June.
    14. Klaus H. Goetz & Ronny Patz & Eugénia Heldt & Henning Schmidtke, 2017. "Measuring the Empowerment of International Organizations: The Evolution of Financial and Staff Capabilities," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 8, pages 51-61, August.
    15. repec:bla:glopol:v:8:y:2017:i:s5:p:51-61 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Roland Vaubel & Axel Dreher & Uğurlu Soylu, 2007. "Staff growth in international organizations: A principal-agent problem? An empirical analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 275-295, December.
    17. Ryan Federo & Angel Saz-Carranza & Xavier Fernandez-í-Marin & Carlos Losada, 2023. "CEO selection in intergovernmental organizations: the clash between control and efficiency in governance," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 27(1), pages 155-180, March.
    18. Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, 2015. "Delegation and pooling in international organizations," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 305-328, September.
    19. Blaeschke, Frédéric & Haug, Peter, 2014. "Does Intermunicipal Cooperation Increase Efficiency? Evidence from the Hessian Wastewater Sector," IWH Discussion Papers 11/2014, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    20. Besir Ceka and Brian Burgo, 2014. "Discovering Cooperation: A Contractual Approach to Institutional Change in Regional International Organizations," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers p0388, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    21. José Luis Castro-Montero & Edwin Alblas & Arthur Dyevre & Nicolas Lampach, 2018. "The Court of Justice and treaty revision: A case of strategic leniency?," European Union Politics, , vol. 19(4), pages 570-596, December.
    22. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/6881 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, 2010. "International regulation without international government: Improving IO performance through orchestration," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 315-344, September.
    24. Björn Bartling & Urs Fischbacher, 2012. "Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(1), pages 67-87.
    25. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/8524 is not listed on IDEAS
    26. Reisen, Helmut, 2010. "The multilateral donor non-system: towards accountability and efficient role assignment," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 4, pages 1-22.
    27. Helen Milner & Dustin Tingley, 2013. "The choice for multilateralism: Foreign aid and American foreign policy," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 313-341, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:10:y:2015:i:1:p:23-41. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.