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The endowment game when n=2

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  • Lu Hong

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Lu Hong, 2009. "The endowment game when n=2," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(1), pages 147-165, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:13:y:2009:i:1:p:147-165
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-009-0073-z
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
    2. Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen, 1991. "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(1), pages 121-128.
    3. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1990. "Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(5), pages 1083-1099, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Feasibile Nash implementation; Two agent endowment game; C72; D02; D71;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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