New results on the existence of open loop Nash equilibria in discrete time dynamic games via generalized Nash games
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DOI: 10.1007/s00186-018-0644-2
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- Mathew P. Abraham & Ankur A. Kulkarni, 2020. "Price-coupling games and the generation expansion planning problem," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 295(1), pages 1-19, December.
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Keywords
Discrete time dynamic games; Open-loop Nash equilibrium; Potential games; Nonconvex optimization; Generalized Nash games;All these keywords.
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