IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joptap/v128y2006i2d10.1007_s10957-006-9018-7.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Resource Dynamics under Partial Cooperation in an Oligopoly

Author

Listed:
  • M. Kopel

    (Vienna University of Technology)

  • F. Szidarovszky

    (University of Arizona)

Abstract

We study the long-run evolution of a renewable resource which is subject to harvest by partially cooperating players who sell the harvested quantities on distinct markets. We derive explicit expressions for the total harvesting quantity of all players in this general framework and investigate the dependence of the total and relative harvest rates on the level of cooperation, available fish stock, and fishing costs. Combining the biological growth model with oligopoly leads to a nonlinear dynamic law for the evolution of the fish stock in the presence of commercial fishing. We provide also existence results for its equilibrium and examine the asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Kopel & F. Szidarovszky, 2006. "Resource Dynamics under Partial Cooperation in an Oligopoly," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 128(2), pages 393-410, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joptap:v:128:y:2006:i:2:d:10.1007_s10957-006-9018-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s10957-006-9018-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10957-006-9018-7
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10957-006-9018-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1999. "Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(6), pages 1999-2043, December.
    2. Cyert, Richard M & DeGroot, Morris H, 1973. "An Analysis of Cooperation and Learning in a Duopoly Context," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(1), pages 24-37, March.
    3. Sandal, Leif K. & Steinshamn, Stein I., 2004. "Dynamic Cournot-competitive harvesting of a common pool resource," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 1781-1799, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola, 2018. "Consumer surplus-enhancing cooperation in a natural resource oligopoly," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 185-193.
    2. Marco F. Boretto & Fausto Cavalli & Ahmad Naimzada, 2021. "Oligopoly model with interdependent preferences: existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium," Working Papers 462, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2021.
    3. Fanti, Luciano & Gori, Luca & Sodini, Mauro, 2012. "Nonlinear dynamics in a Cournot duopoly with relative profit delegation," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 45(12), pages 1469-1478.
    4. Panchuk, A. & Puu, T., 2015. "Oligopoly model with recurrent renewal of capital revisited," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 119-128.
    5. Marco F. Boretto & Fausto Cavalli & Ahmad Naimzada, 2021. "Characterization of Nash equilibria in Cournotian oligopolies with interdependent preferences," Working Papers 463, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2021.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Colombo, Luca & Labrecciosa, Paola, 2018. "Consumer surplus-enhancing cooperation in a natural resource oligopoly," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 185-193.
    2. Fanti, Luciano & Gori, Luca & Sodini, Mauro, 2012. "Nonlinear dynamics in a Cournot duopoly with relative profit delegation," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 45(12), pages 1469-1478.
    3. Armstrong, Christopher & Nicoletti, Allison & Zhou, Frank S., 2022. "Executive stock options and systemic risk," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(1), pages 256-276.
    4. Doyen, Luc & Péreau, Jean-Christophe, 2012. "Sustainable coalitions in the commons," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 57-64.
    5. Marc Escrihuela-Villar & Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita, 2018. "A note on the privatization neutrality result with colluding private firms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(4), pages 2016-2025.
    6. Ali, Ashiq & Klasa, Sandy & Yeung, Eric, 2014. "Industry concentration and corporate disclosure policy," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 240-264.
    7. Ya‐chin Wang & Leonard F.s. Wang, 2009. "Equivalence Of Competition Mode In A Vertically Differentiated Duopoly With Delegation," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 77(4), pages 577-590, December.
    8. Barr, Jason & Saraceno, Francesco, 2009. "Organization, learning and cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 39-53, May.
    9. Canice Prendergast, 2000. "The Tenuous Tradeoff Between Risk and Incentives," NBER Working Papers 7815, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Wunhong Su & Chun Guo & Xiaobao Song, 2022. "Media coverage, Environment Protection Law and environmental research and development: evidence from the Chinese-listed firms," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 24(5), pages 6953-6983, May.
    11. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2005. "Managerial incentives and collusive behavior," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1501-1523, August.
    12. Antonio Falato, 2006. "Paying to Make a Difference: Executive Compensation and Product Dynamics," 2006 Meeting Papers 690, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    13. Werner Neus & Manfred Stadler, 2018. "Common holdings and strategic manager compensation: The case of an asymmetric triopoly," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(7), pages 814-820, October.
    14. Bushman, Robert M. & Smith, Abbie J., 2001. "Financial accounting information and corporate governance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 237-333, December.
    15. Bischi, Gian Italo & Lamantia, Fabio, 2007. "Harvesting dynamics in protected and unprotected areas," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 348-370, March.
    16. Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Nikolaos Georgantzís & Constantine Manasakis & Evangelos Mitrokostas & Emmanuel Petrakis, 2012. "Managerial compensation contracts in quantity-setting duopoly," Working Papers 2012/17, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    17. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018. "Does improved information improve incentives?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 291-307.
    18. An, Suwei, 2023. "Essays on incentive contracts, M&As, and firm risk," Other publications TiSEM dd97d2f5-1c9d-47c5-ba62-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    19. Fabrice Collard & Carole Haritchabalet, 2012. "Valuing satellite systems to support fishing in a dynamic competitive model," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(7), pages 899-916, March.
    20. Kirstein, Roland & Kirstein, Annette, 2004. "Inefficient Intra-Firm Incentives Can Stabilize Cartels in Cournot Oligopolies," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2004-09, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joptap:v:128:y:2006:i:2:d:10.1007_s10957-006-9018-7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.