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On the core: complement-reduced game and max-reduced game

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  • Yan-An Hwang

Abstract

This paper presents two characterizations of the core on the domain of all NTU games. One is based on consistency with respect to “complement-reduced game” and converse consistency with respect to “max-reduced game”. The other is based on consistency with respect to “max-reduced game” and weak converse consistency with respect to “complement-reduced game”. Besides, we introduce an alternative definition of individual rationality, we name conditional individual rationality, which is compatible with non-emptiness. We discuss axiomatic characterizations involving conditional individual rationality for the core. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

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  • Yan-An Hwang, 2013. "On the core: complement-reduced game and max-reduced game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 339-355, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:42:y:2013:i:2:p:339-355
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-013-0372-z
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    Cited by:

    1. Pedro Calleja & Francesc Llerena, 2017. "Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 48(1), pages 197-220, January.
    2. Calleja, Pere & Llerena Garrés, Francesc, 2015. "On the (in)compatibility of rationality, monotonicity and consistency for cooperative games," Working Papers 2072/247807, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.

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