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Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing

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  • Rajat Deb
  • Tae Seo

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Suggested Citation

  • Rajat Deb & Tae Seo, 2010. "Strategy-proofness and public good provision using referenda based on unequal cost sharing," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(1), pages 223-236, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:39:y:2010:i:1:p:223-236
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-009-0192-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
    2. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1984. "Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 171-193, July.
    3. François Maniquet & Yves Sprumont, 2004. "Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 627-640, March.
    4. Deb, Rajat & Razzolini, Laura, 1999. "Auction-Like Mechanisms for Pricing Excludable Public Goods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 340-368, October.
    5. Edward Clarke, 1971. "Multipart pricing of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 17-33, September.
    6. Mark A. Satterthwaite & Hugo Sonnenschein, 1981. "Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 48(4), pages 587-597.
    7. Ledyard, John O. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2002. "The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 153-171, February.
    8. Hervé Moulin, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(2), pages 305-325.
    9. Bliss, Christopher & Nalebuff, Barry, 1984. "Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 1-12, November.
    10. Rajat Deb & Laura Razzolini & Tae Seo, 2006. "The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 10(3), pages 205-232, December.
    11. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategy-proof; Quota rule; Public good; Cost sharing; H41; C72; D78; D82;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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