Decreasing serial cost sharing: an axiomatic characterization
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-009-0165-6
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- Jens Leth Hougaard & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2007. "Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing: an Axiomatic Characterization," Discussion Papers 07-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Moulin, Herve, 2002.
"Axiomatic cost and surplus sharing,"
Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 6, pages 289-357,
Elsevier.
- Moulin, Herve, 2001. "Axiomatic Cost and Surplis-Sharing," Working Papers 2001-06, Rice University, Department of Economics.
- Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-1037, September.
- Jens Leth Hougaard & Lars Thorlund-Petersen, 2000. "The stand-alone test and decreasing serial cost sharing," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 16(2), pages 355-362.
- Jens Hougaard & Lars Østerdal, 2009.
"Decreasing serial cost sharing: an axiomatic characterization,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(4), pages 469-479, November.
- Jens Leth Hougaard & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2007. "Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing: an Axiomatic Characterization," Discussion Papers 07-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Moulin Herve & Shenker Scott, 1994. "Average Cost Pricing versus Serial Cost Sharing: An Axiomatic Comparison," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 178-201, October.
- Hougaard, Jens Leth & Thorlund-Petersen, Lars, 2001. "Mixed serial cost sharing," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 51-68, January.
- Angeles de Frutos, M., 1998. "Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing under Economies of Scale," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 245-275, April.
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Cited by:
- Jens Hougaard & Lars Østerdal, 2009.
"Decreasing serial cost sharing: an axiomatic characterization,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(4), pages 469-479, November.
- Jens Leth Hougaard & Lars Peter Østerdal, 2007. "Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing: an Axiomatic Characterization," Discussion Papers 07-02, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- M. Albizuri & Henar Díez & Amaia Sarachu, 2014. "The reverse self-dual serial cost-sharing rule," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 22(2), pages 578-599, July.
- Jop Schouten & Mirjam GrooteSchaarsberg & Peter Borm, 2024.
"Cost sharing methods for capacity restricted cooperative purchasing situations,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 28(2), pages 347-390, June.
- Schouten, Jop & Groote Schaarsberg, Mirjam & Borm, Peter, 2020. "Cost Sharing Methods for Capacity Restricted Cooperative Purchasing Situations," Other publications TiSEM aa7f747d-c97b-4655-b6cb-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Schouten, Jop & Groote Schaarsberg, Mirjam & Borm, Peter, 2024. "Cost sharing methods for capacity restricted cooperative purchasing situations," Other publications TiSEM a607808c-768c-49ab-8ed2-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Schouten, Jop & Groote Schaarsberg, Mirjam & Borm, Peter, 2020. "Cost Sharing Methods for Capacity Restricted Cooperative Purchasing Situations," Discussion Paper 2020-017, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Pham, Ngoc Anh, 2019. "Lorenz comparison between Increasing serial and Shapley value cost-sharing rules," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 49-52.
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Elsevier.
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- M. Albizuri & Henar Díez & Amaia Sarachu, 2014. "The reverse self-dual serial cost-sharing rule," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 22(2), pages 578-599, July.
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More about this item
Keywords
Serial cost sharing; Cost allocation; Axiomatic characterization; D23; D71; L24;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- L24 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Contracting Out; Joint Ventures
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