IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v37y2008i4p505-523.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: general bargaining outcomes

Author

Listed:
  • Naoki Watanabe
  • Shigeo Muto

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Naoki Watanabe & Shigeo Muto, 2008. "Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: general bargaining outcomes," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 37(4), pages 505-523, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:37:y:2008:i:4:p:505-523
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-008-0130-9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-008-0130-9
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00182-008-0130-9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nakayama, Mikio & Quintas, Luis, 1991. "Stable payoffs in resale-proof trades of information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 339-349, August.
    2. Muto, Shigeo, 1990. "Resale-proofness and coalition-proof Nash equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 337-361, December.
    3. Kamien, Morton I. & Tauman, Yair & Zang, Israel, 1988. "Optimal license fees for a new product," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 77-106, August.
    4. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, 1986. "How to License Intangible Property," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(3), pages 567-589.
    5. R. M. Thrall & W. F. Lucas, 1963. "N‐person games in partition function form," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(1), pages 281-298, March.
    6. Kamien, Morton I. & Oren, Shmuel S. & Tauman, Yair, 1992. "Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 483-508.
    7. Morton I. Kamien & Yair Tauman, 1986. "Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(3), pages 471-491.
    8. Sen, Debapriya, 2005. "Fee versus royalty reconsidered," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 141-147, October.
    9. Morton Davis & Michael Maschler, 1965. "The kernel of a cooperative game," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 12(3), pages 223-259, September.
    10. Sempere Monerris, Jose J & Vannetelbosch, Vincent J, 2001. "The Relevance of Bargaining for the Licensing of a Cost-Reducing Innovation," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(2), pages 101-115, April.
    11. L. S. Shapley & Martin Shubik, 1967. "Ownership and the Production Function," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 81(1), pages 88-111.
    12. Muto, Shigeo, 1987. "Possibility of relicensing and patent protection," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 927-945, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kishimoto, Shin & Watanabe, Naoki & Muto, Shigeo, 2011. "Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: Asymptotic results in a general Cournot market," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 114-123, March.
    2. Sen, Debapriya & Tauman, Yair, 2007. "General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 163-186, April.
    3. Saracho, Ana I., 2011. "Licensing information goods," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 187-199, March.
    4. Yair Tauman & Debrapiya Sen, 2012. "Patents and Licenses," Department of Economics Working Papers 12-05, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    5. Debapriya Sen & Giorgos Stamatopoulos, 2009. "Technology Transfer Under Returns To Scale," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(3), pages 337-365, June.
    6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 177-189, September.
    7. Hong, Xianpei & Zhou, Menghuan & Gong, Yeming, 2021. "Dilemma of quality information disclosure in technology licensing," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 294(2), pages 543-557.
    8. Badia, Bruno D. & Tumendemberel, Biligbaatar, 2016. "On the licensing of a technology with unknown use," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 220-233.
    9. Creane, Anthony & Ko, Chiu Yu & Konishi, Hideo, 2013. "Choosing a licensee from heterogeneous rivals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 254-268.
    10. Sen, Debapriya & Tauman, Yair, 2018. "Patent licensing in a Cournot oligopoly: General results," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 37-48.
    11. Miguel González‐Maestre, 2008. "Coordination Incentives Under Complementary Cost‐Reducing Technologies," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3), pages 221-234, September.
    12. Sudipto Bhattacharya & Claude d’Aspremont & Sergei Guriev & Debapriya Sen & Yair Tauman, 2014. "Cooperation in R&D: Patenting, Licensing, and Contracting," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Kalyan Chatterjee & William Samuelson (ed.), Game Theory and Business Applications, edition 2, chapter 0, pages 265-286, Springer.
    13. Stefano Colombo & Luigi Filippini, 2015. "Patent Licensing with Bertrand Competitors," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(1), pages 1-16, January.
    14. Mukherjee, Arijit, 2010. "Licensing a new product: Fee vs. royalty licensing with unionized labor market," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 735-742, August.
    15. Amir, Rabah & Encaoua, David & Lefouili, Yassine, 2014. "Optimal licensing of uncertain patents in the shadow of litigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 320-338.
    16. Aoki, Reiko & Tauman, Yair, 2001. "Patent licensing with spillovers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 125-130, October.
    17. Bagchi, Aniruddha & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2014. "Technology licensing in a differentiated oligopoly," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 455-465.
    18. Sougata Poddar & Uday Bhanu Sinha, 2010. "Patent Licensing from a High‐Cost Firm to a Low‐Cost Firm," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 86(274), pages 384-395, September.
    19. Aineas Kostas Mallios, 2024. "Licensing and secrecy under imperfect intellectual property protection," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 527-552, November.
    20. Stamatopoulos, Giorgos & Tauman, Yair, 2008. "Licensing of a quality-improving innovation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 410-438, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Licensing; Coalition structure; Bargaining set; Core; C71; D45; D43;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:37:y:2008:i:4:p:505-523. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.