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Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures

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  • Kimmo Eriksson
  • Olle Häggström

Abstract

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  • Kimmo Eriksson & Olle Häggström, 2008. "Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(3), pages 409-420, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:409-420
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-007-0081-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kimmo Eriksson & Jonas Sjöstrand & Pontus Strimling, 2007. "Optimal Expected Rank in a Two-Sided Secretary Problem," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 55(5), pages 921-931, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alpern, Steve & Katrantzi, Ioanna & Ramsey, David, 2014. "Equilibrium population dynamics when mating is by mutual choice based on age," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 63-72.
    2. Florian M. Biermann, 2011. "A Measure to Compare Matchings in Marriage Markets," Working Papers 2011.41, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    3. André Veski & Kaire Põder, 2018. "Zero-intelligence agents looking for a job," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 13(3), pages 615-640, October.
    4. Tadeas Priklopil & Krishnendu Chatterjee, 2015. "Evolution of Decisions in Population Games with Sequentially Searching Individuals," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(4), pages 1-25, September.
    5. Ismail Saglam, 2014. "Simple Heuristics as Equilibrium Strategies in Mutual Sequential Mate Search," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 17(1), pages 1-12.
    6. Gonczarowski, Yannai A. & Nisan, Noam & Ostrovsky, Rafail & Rosenbaum, Will, 2019. "A stable marriage requires communication," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 626-647.
    7. Vinay Ramani & K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao, 2018. "Paths to stability and uniqueness in two-sided matching markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1137-1150, November.
    8. James Boudreau, 2008. "Preference Structure and Random Paths to Stability in Matching Markets," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(67), pages 1-12.

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