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Does moral play equilibrate?

Author

Listed:
  • Immanuel Bomze

    (University of Vienna)

  • Werner Schachinger

    (University of Vienna)

  • Jörgen Weibull

    (Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

Some finite and symmetric two-player games have no (pure or mixed) symmetric Nash equilibrium when played by partly morally motivated players.The reason is that the “right thing to do” may be not to randomize. We analyze this issue both under complete information between equally moral players and under incomplete information between players of arbitrary degrees of morality. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and illustrate the results with examples and counter examples.

Suggested Citation

  • Immanuel Bomze & Werner Schachinger & Jörgen Weibull, 2021. "Does moral play equilibrate?," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(1), pages 305-315, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:71:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-020-01246-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01246-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Benaïm, Michel & Hofbauer, Josef & Hopkins, Ed, 2009. "Learning in games with unstable equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1694-1709, July.
    2. Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1995. "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 58-81, March.
    3. Ingela Alger & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013. "Homo Moralis—Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2269-2302, November.
    4. Charalambos D. Aliprantis & Kim C. Border, 2006. "Infinite Dimensional Analysis," Springer Books, Springer, edition 0, number 978-3-540-29587-7, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mohanty, Sambit & Rao, K.S. Mallikarjuna & Roy, Jaideep, 2024. "Kantian imperatives in public goods networks," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 224(C), pages 194-214.
    2. Thomas Eichner & Marco Runkel, 2024. "Homo Oeconomicus as the Homo Moralis’ Party Pooper: Heterogeneous Morality in Public Good Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 11231, CESifo.
    3. Alger, Ingela & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2023. "Evolution and Kantian morality: a correction and addendum," TSE Working Papers 23-1406, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash equilibrium; Morality; Homo moralis; Social preferences; Incomplete information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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