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Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies

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  • Camelia Bejan
  • Florin Bidian

Abstract

We analyze the limit behavior of sequences of oligopolistic equilibria in which firms follow objectives consistent with their shareholders’ interests. We show that convergence to a competitive outcome may fail for some distributions of firms’ shares across consumers and provide a characterization of the class of ownership structures that lead to Walrasian equilibrium allocations in the limit. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

Suggested Citation

  • Camelia Bejan & Florin Bidian, 2012. "Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 50(3), pages 571-602, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:50:y:2012:i:3:p:571-602
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-010-0585-3
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    Cited by:

    1. Hao Ding, 2024. "Can common institutional ownership inhibit the formation of zombie firms? Evidence from China," Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, The Crawford School, The Australian National University, vol. 38(1), pages 34-56, May.
    2. Camelia Bejan & Florin Bidian, 2012. "Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 50(3), pages 571-602, August.
    3. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09ieq060086 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Camelia Bejan, 2020. "Investment and financing in incomplete markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(1), pages 149-182, February.
    5. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2013. "Production externalities: internalization by voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(2), pages 403-424, June.
    6. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09ieq060086 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Egbert Dierker & Hildegard Dierker, 2012. "Ownership structure and control in incomplete market economies with transferable utility," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(3), pages 713-728, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Firm’s objective; Strategic foundations of competitive equilibrium; Ownership structure; D21; D43; D51;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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