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A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market

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  • Stefano Demichelis
  • Klaus Ritzberger

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  • Stefano Demichelis & Klaus Ritzberger, 2011. "A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 46(2), pages 221-254, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:46:y:2011:i:2:p:221-254
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-009-0511-8
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2011. "Production externalities: internalization by voting," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-00972983, HAL.
    2. Jacques Dreze, 2016. "Existence and multiplicity of temporary equilibria under nominal price rigidities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(1), pages 279-298, June.
    3. Milo Bianchi & Rose-Anne Dana & Elyès Jouini, 2022. "Shareholder heterogeneity, asymmetric information, and the equilibrium manager," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(4), pages 1101-1134, June.
    4. Milo Bianchi & Rose-Anne Dana & Elyes Jouini, 2022. "Shareholder heterogeneity, asymmetric information, and the equilibrium manager," Post-Print hal-03693971, HAL.
    5. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09ieq060086 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Milo Bianchi & Rose-Anne Dana & Elyès Jouini, 2022. "Equilibrium CEO contract with belief heterogeneity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(2), pages 505-546, September.
    7. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2013. "Production externalities: internalization by voting," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(2), pages 403-424, June.
    8. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09ieq060086 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Bogliacino, Francesco & Rampa, Giorgio, 2014. "Expectational bottlenecks and the emerging of new organizational forms," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 28-39.
    10. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09ieq060086 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Francesca Busetto & Giulio Codognato & Giorgia Pavan & Simone Tonin, 2023. "Cournotian duopolistic firms may be Walrasian: a case in the Gabszewicz and Vial model," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 140(2), pages 121-140, October.
    12. Volker Britz & P. Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2013. "A bargaining theory of the firm," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(1), pages 45-75, September.
    13. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09ieq060086 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2011. "Production externalities: internalization by voting," SciencePo Working papers hal-00972983, HAL.
    15. Michael Zierhut, 2021. "Indeterminacy of Cournot–Walras equilibrium with incomplete markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(1), pages 81-114, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; General equilibrium; Objective function of the firm; Shareholder voting; Stock markets; D21; D43; D51; G32; G34;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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