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The Formateurs’ Role in Government Formation

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  • Daniel Seidmann
  • Eyal Winter
  • Elan Pavlov

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Seidmann & Eyal Winter & Elan Pavlov, 2007. "The Formateurs’ Role in Government Formation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(3), pages 427-445, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:31:y:2007:i:3:p:427-445
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0102-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    2. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "A Structural Model of Government Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 27-70, January.
    3. Morelli, Massimo, 1999. "Demand Competition and Policy Compromise in Legislative Bargaining," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(4), pages 809-820, December.
    4. Baron, David P., 1991. "A Spatial Bargaining Theory of Government Formation in Parliamentary Systems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 85(1), pages 137-164, March.
    5. Norman, Peter, 2002. "Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 322-353, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. David Baron & Alexander Hirsch, 2012. "Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(3), pages 639-681, April.
    2. Marco Battaglini, 2021. "Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(11), pages 3206-3258.
    3. Maria Montero, 2015. "A Model of Protocoalition Bargaining with Breakdown Probability," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(2), pages 1-18, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Formateurs; Government formation; Sequential bargaining; C7; D7;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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