The price of size and financial market allocations
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0042-x
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- Zhixiong Zeng, 2004. "The Price Of Size And Financial Market Allocations," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 86, Royal Economic Society.
References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
- Zhixiong Zeng, 2013.
"A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization,"
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- Zeng, Zhixiong, 2010. "A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization," MPRA Paper 24752, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Zeng, Zhixiong, 2011. "A theory of the non-neutrality of money with banking frictions and bank recapitalization," MPRA Paper 33471, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Yi Jin & Zhixiong Zeng, 2011. "The Financial and Macroeconomic Implications of Banking Frictions and Banking Riskiness," Monash Economics Working Papers 14-11, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Jin, Yi & Zeng, Zhixiong, 2014. "Banking risk and macroeconomic fluctuations," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 350-360.
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More about this item
Keywords
Price of size; Nonlinear financial contract; Endogenous asset indivisibility; Value of firms; D82; G14; G32;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
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