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Message spaces for perfect correlated equilibria

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  • Shurojit Chatterji
  • Srihari Govindan

Abstract

We show that a perfect correlated equilibrium distribution of an N-person game, as defined by Dhillon and Mertens (1996) can be achieved using a finite number of copies of the strategy space as the message space. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Shurojit Chatterji & Srihari Govindan, 2006. "Message spaces for perfect correlated equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(2), pages 475-479, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:28:y:2006:i:2:p:475-479
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-005-0630-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    2. Dhillon, Amrita & Mertens, Jean Francois, 1996. "Perfect Correlated Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 279-302, February.
    3. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 81-98, January.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Liu, Heng & Ghosh, Gagan, 2020. "A note on perfect correlated equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).

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