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Large games with transformed summary statistics

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Listed:
  • Haomiao Yu
  • Wei Zhu

Abstract

The existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is shown for a non-cooperative game with a continuum of small players and a compact action space. The players’ payoffs depend on their own actions and the mean of the transformed strategy profiles. This covers the case when the payoffs depend on players’ own actions and finitely many summary statistics. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Haomiao Yu & Wei Zhu, 2005. "Large games with transformed summary statistics," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(1), pages 237-241, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:26:y:2005:i:1:p:237-241
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0516-2
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Haomiao Yu, 2014. "Rationalizability in large games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(2), pages 457-479, February.
    2. Wei He & Yeneng Sun, 2018. "Conditional expectation of correspondences and economic applications," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(2), pages 265-299, August.
    3. Wu, Bin & Xu, Hanping, 2022. "Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal Nash equilibria with coarser traits," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
    4. Barelli, Paulo & Duggan, John, 2015. "Extremal choice equilibrium with applications to large games, stochastic games, & endogenous institutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 95-130.
    5. An, Yonghong & Zhang, Zhixiang, 2012. "Congestion with heterogeneous commuters," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 557-565.
    6. Xiang Sun & Yongchao Zhang, 2015. "Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in nonatomic games with infinite-dimensional action spaces," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 161-182, January.
    7. Rauh, Michael T., 2009. "Strategic complementarities and search market equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 959-978, July.
    8. Paulo Barelli & John Duggan, 2011. "Extremal Choice Equilibrium: Existence and Purification with Infinite-Dimensional Externalities," RCER Working Papers 567, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    9. Kolpin, Van, 2009. "Pure strategy equilibria in large demographic summary games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 132-141, July.

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