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Imperfect recall and the relationships between solution concepts in extensive games

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  • Jeffrey Kline

Abstract

In a game of imperfect recall, a sequential equilibrium may not be a Nash equilibrium, and a perfect equilibrium may not be a sequential equilibrium. Sufficiency conditions weaker than perfect recall are given to ensure the standard relationships hold between perfect equilibrium, sequential equilibrium and Nash equilibrium. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey Kline, 2005. "Imperfect recall and the relationships between solution concepts in extensive games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(3), pages 703-710, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:25:y:2005:i:3:p:703-710
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0454-4
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hillas, John & Kvasov, Dmitriy, 2020. "Backward induction in games without perfect recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 207-218.
    2. Lambert, Nicolas S. & Marple, Adrian & Shoham, Yoav, 2019. "On equilibria in games with imperfect recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 164-185.
    3. M. Levati & Matthias Uhl & Ro’i Zultan, 2014. "Imperfect recall and time inconsistencies: an experimental test of the absentminded driver “paradox”," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 65-88, February.

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