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Playing Cournot although they shouldn’t

Author

Listed:
  • Miguel Fonseca
  • Steffen Huck
  • Hans-Theo Normann

Abstract

In this note, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment in a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric cost. Risk dominance considerations allow to select a unique equilibrium in which the low-cost firm is the Stackelberg leader. The data, however, do not support the theory as simultaneous-move play is modal. Average output choices are in line with the Cournot equilibrium. This suggests that Cournot is a much more robust predictor for competition in markets than theory suggests. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2005

Suggested Citation

  • Miguel Fonseca & Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann, 2005. "Playing Cournot although they shouldn’t," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(3), pages 669-677, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:25:y:2005:i:3:p:669-677
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0456-2
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Anders Poulsen & Michael Roos, 2010. "Do people make strategic commitments? Experimental evidence on strategic information avoidance," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(2), pages 206-225, June.
    2. Miguel Fonseca & Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann, 2006. "Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(3), pages 443-456, October.
    3. Anders Poulsen & Jonathan Tan, 2007. "Information acquisition in the ultimatum game: An experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(4), pages 391-409, December.
    4. Anthony Ziegelmeyer & Katinka Pantz, 2005. "Collaborative Networks in Experimental Triopolies," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-38, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    5. Waichman, Israel & Requate, Till & Siang, Ch'ng Kean, 2010. "Pre-play communication in Cournot competition: An experiment with students and managers," Economics Working Papers 2010-09, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
    6. Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2011. "Endogenous Move Structure and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Theory and Experiment," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(5), pages 721-754, October.
    7. Muller, Wieland, 2006. "Allowing for two production periods in the Cournot duopoly: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 100-111, May.
    8. Santos-Pinto, Luís, 2008. "Making sense of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing in duopoly markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(3-4), pages 657-666, December.
    9. Hildenbrand, Andreas, 2013. "Is a firm a firm? A Stackelberg experiment," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 7, pages 1-26.
    10. Poulsen, Anders, 2007. "Learning to Make Strategic Moves: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 10927, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Fischer, Christian & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2019. "Collusion and bargaining in asymmetric Cournot duopoly—An experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 360-379.
    12. Roux, Catherine & Santos-Pinto, Luís & Thöni, Christian, 2016. "Home bias in multimarket Cournot games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 361-371.
    13. Poulsen, Anders U. & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2004. "Can Information Backfire? - Experimental Evidence from the Ultimatum Game," Working Papers 04-16, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
    14. Shakun Datta Mago & Emmanuel Dechenaux, 2009. "Price leadership and firm size asymmetry: an experimental analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(3), pages 289-317, September.
    15. Hinloopen, Jeroen & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2014. "Output commitment through product bundling: Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 164-180.
    16. Anders U. Poulsen & Michael V. M. Roos, 2009. "Do People Make Strategic Moves? Experimental Evidence on Strategic Information Avoidance," Discussion Papers 09-06, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    17. Hildenbrand, Andreas, 2010. "Cournot or Stackelberg competition? A survey on experimental evidence," MPRA Paper 24468, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Nadia A. Streletskaya & Samuel D. Bell & Maik Kecinski & Tongzhe Li & Simanti Banerjee & Leah H. Palm‐Forster & David Pannell, 2020. "Agricultural Adoption and Behavioral Economics: Bridging the Gap," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 42(1), pages 54-66, March.

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