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Computationally restricted unmediated talk under incomplete information

Author

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  • Amparo Urbano
  • Jose Vila

Abstract

We show the role of unmediated talk with computational complexity bounds as both an information transmission and a coordination device for the class of two-player games with incomplete information and rational parameters. We prove that any communication equilibrium payoff of such games can be reached as a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium payoff of the game extended by a two phase universal mechanism of interim computationally restricted pre-play communication. The communication protocols are designed with the help of modern cryptographic tools. A familiar context in which our results could be applied is bilateral trading with incomplete information. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Amparo Urbano & Jose Vila, 2004. "Computationally restricted unmediated talk under incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 23(2), pages 283-320, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:23:y:2004:i:2:p:283-320
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0378-z
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. , & ,, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.
    2. Vida, Péter & Āzacis, Helmuts, 2013. "A detail-free mediator," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 101-115.
    3. Indrajit Ray, 2002. "Multiple Equilibrium Problem and Non-Canonical Correlation Devices," Working Papers 2002-24, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    4. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5279 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Joseph Y. Halpern, 2007. "Computer Science and Game Theory: A Brief Survey," Papers cs/0703148, arXiv.org.
    6. repec:dau:papers:123456789/8159 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Peter Vida, 2005. "A Detail-free Mediator and the 3 Player Case," CERS-IE WORKING PAPERS 0511, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies.
    8. Halpern, Joseph Y. & Pass, Rafael, 2015. "Algorithmic rationality: Game theory with costly computation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 246-268.

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