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Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked

Author

Listed:
  • Lars Ehlers

    (Département de Sciences Économiques and C.R.D.E., Université de Montréal, Montréal, Québec H3C 3J7, CANADA)

Abstract

We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences. Thomson (1994a), Sönmez (1994), and Moulin (1999) introduce three different resource-monotonicity conditions. In each characterization they derive, the axioms are independent. Under Pareto-optimality, the three resource-monotonicity conditions are equivalent. We investigate whether the interchange of these conditions still yields a valid characterization, and when the characterization still holds, whether it is a tight result or not. We strengthen each of the results, that is either the used resource-monotonicity condition can be replaced by a weaker one, or by using another resource-monotonicity condition, the result is not tight. Our main result is that when at least three agents are present, the class of fixed-path rationing methods is characterized by weak one-sided resource-monotonicity, strategy-proofness, and consistency.

Suggested Citation

  • Lars Ehlers, 2002. "Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(1), pages 113-131.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:20:y:2002:i:1:p:113-131
    Note: Received: April 24, 2000; revised version: April 10, 2001
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bergantiños, Gustavo & Massó, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro, 2015. "The division problem under constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 56-77.
    2. Erlanson, Albin & Szwagrzak, Karol, 2013. "Strategy-Proof Package Assignment," Working Papers 2013:43, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    3. Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Alejandro Neme, 2015. "Stable partitions in many division problems: the proportional and the sequential dictator solutions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 79(2), pages 227-250, September.
    4. Kesten, Onur, 2006. "More on the uniform rule: Characterizations without Pareto optimality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 192-200, March.
    5. Thomson, William, 2011. "Chapter Twenty-One - Fair Allocation Rules," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 21, pages 393-506, Elsevier.
    6. Eun Jeong Heo & Sunghoon Hong & Youngsub Chun, 2021. "Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(1), pages 1-19, July.
    7. Chun, Youngsub, 2003. "One-sided population monotonicity, separability, and the uniform rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 343-349, March.
    8. Lars Ehlers & Bettina Klaus, 2004. "Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(4), pages 545-560, August.
    9. Massó, Jordi & Moreno de Barreda, Inés, 2011. "On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 467-484, June.
    10. Erlanson, Albin & Flores-Szwagrzak, Karol, 2015. "Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 137-162.
    11. Gustavo Bergantiños & Jordi Massó & Alejandro Neme, 2012. "The division problem with maximal capacity constraints," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 29-57, March.
    12. Bochet, Olivier & Sakai, Toyotaka, 2010. "Secure implementation in allotment economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 35-49, January.
    13. Moulin, Hervé, 2017. "One dimensional mechanism design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    14. Lars Ehlers, 2011. "A characterization of the uniform rule without Pareto-optimality," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 447-452, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Single-peaked; Resource-monotonicity; Fixed-path rationing methods.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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