IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joecth/v17y2001i1p53-80.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates

Author

Listed:
  • Dominique Lepelley

    (GEMMA, Department of Economics, Université de Caen, Esplanade de la Paix,14032 Caen Cedex, FRANCE)

  • Vincent Merlin

    (CNRS and GEMMA, MRSH bureau 230, Université de Caen, Esplanade de la Paix, 14032 Caen Cedex, FRANCE)

Abstract

A no-show paradox occurs each time a single voter or a group of voters can manipulate the outcome by not participating to the election process. Among other voting procedures, the scoring run-off methods, which eliminate progressively the alternatives on the basis of scoring rules, suffer from this flaw. We here estimate how frequent this paradox is for three candidate elections under the classical Impartial Culture and Impartial Anonymous Culture assumptions, for different population sizes. The conditions under which this paradox occurs are also described, as well as the relationships with manipulations for a fixed number of voters.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin, 2001. "Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 17(1), pages 53-80.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:17:y:2001:i:1:p:53-80
    Note: Received: October 21, 1999; revised version: January 12, 2000
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/1017001/10170053.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Eyal Baharad & Shmuel Nitzan, 2011. "Condorcet vs. Borda in light of a dual majoritarian approach," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(2), pages 151-162, August.
    2. Brandt, Felix & Geist, Christian & Peters, Dominik, 2017. "Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 18-27.
    3. Florenz Plassmann & T. Tideman, 2014. "How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 31-75, January.
    4. Mohamed, Issam A.W., 2010. "Tyrannical Greed and National Disintegration of the Sudanese Nation," MPRA Paper 31812, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Conal Duddy, 2014. "Condorcet’s principle and the strong no-show paradoxes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 275-285, August.
    6. Sébastien Courtin & Boniface Mbih & Issofa Moyouwou & Thomas Senné, 2010. "The reinforcement axiom under sequential positional rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 35(3), pages 473-500, September.
    7. Wilson, Mark C. & Pritchard, Geoffrey, 2007. "Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 244-256, December.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:17:y:2001:i:1:p:53-80. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.