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Demand bargaining in legislatures

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel Cardona-Coll

    (Departament d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de les Illes Balears, 07071 Palma de Mallorca , SPAIN)

  • Francisco M. Mancera

    (Departamento de EconomÎa e H. EconÕmica, Universidad de MÂlaga, 29071 MÂlaga, SPAIN)

Abstract

We analyze a pure bargaining problem when decisions require simple majority and self interested players make unilateral demands. In contrast to the case where proposals consist of complete sharing profiles, this content of proposals prevents implicit side-payments inside the committee, and so non-discriminatory outcomes might be expected. We show that in some settings this is the case and the surplus is universally shared.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Cardona-Coll & Francisco M. Mancera, 2000. "Demand bargaining in legislatures," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 16(1), pages 163-180.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:16:y:2000:i:1:p:163-180
    Note: Received: October 12, 1998; revised version: July 1, 1999
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Montero, Maria & Vidal-Puga, Juan J., 2011. "Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 395-408, March.
    2. Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2013. "Reference dependent altruism in demand bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 127-140.
    3. Daniel Cardona-Coll, 2000. "Multi-Issue Bargaining Under Budget-Constraints," Working Papers. Serie AD 2000-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    4. Daniel Cardona & Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2016. "Time-Preference Heterogeneity and Multiplicity of Equilibria in Two-Group Bargaining," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(2), pages 1-17, May.
    5. Yves Breitmoser, 2012. "Proto-coalition bargaining and the core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(3), pages 581-599, November.
    6. Daniel Cardona-Coll, 2003. "Bargaining and Strategic Demand Commitment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(4), pages 357-374, June.
    7. Klaus Abbink, 2006. "Majority rip-off in referendum voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 1-21, January.
    8. Breitmoser, Yves & Tan, Jonathan H.W., 2011. "Ultimata bargaining: generosity without social motives," MPRA Paper 33613, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bargaining; Coalition formation; Majority voting; Non-cooperative games.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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