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Elastic demand, sunk costs and the Kreps-Scheinkman extension of the Cournot model

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  • Paul Madden

    (School of Economic Studies, Manchester University, Manchester M13 9PL, UK)

Abstract

The paper shows that, with any rationing mechanism between the efficient and proportional extremes, the Kreps-Scheinkman two-stage quantity-price game reduces to the Cournot model if demand is uniformly elastic and if all costs are sunk at the first stage, thus providing positive results to set against existing negative statements.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Madden, 1998. "Elastic demand, sunk costs and the Kreps-Scheinkman extension of the Cournot model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 12(1), pages 199-212.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:12:y:1998:i:1:p:199-212
    Note: Received: May 24, 1995; revised version: March 6, 1997
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. De Francesco, Massimo A. & Salvadori, Neri, 2023. "Bertrand-Edgeworth game under oligopoly. General results and comparisons with duopoly," MPRA Paper 118237, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. James D. Dana Jr. & Kevin R. Williams, 2018. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Sequential Quantity-Price Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2136R2, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Mar 2019.
    3. Clark, Ken & Kaas, Leo & Madden, Paul, 2006. "Minimum wage increases can lead to wage reductions by imperfectly competitive firms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 287-292, May.
    4. Neary, J. Peter & Tharakan, Joe, 2012. "International trade with endogenous mode of competition in general equilibrium," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 118-132.
    5. L Kaas & P Madden, 2002. "Competitive Wage Cycles with Imperfect Output Market Competition," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0212, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    6. James D. Dana Jr. & Kevin R. Williams, 2020. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Sequential Quantity-Price Games," NBER Working Papers 26794, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. J. Peter Neary & Joe Tharakan, 2005. "Endogenous mode of competition in general equilibrium," Working Papers 200526, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    8. Massimo A. De Francesco, 2009. "A dynamic entry and price game with capacity indivisibility," Department of Economics University of Siena 577, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    9. Wu, Xin-wang & Zhu, Quan-tao & Sun, Laixiang, 2012. "On equivalence between Cournot competition and the Kreps–Scheinkman game," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 116-125.
    10. Mazzoli, Marco & Lombardini, Simone, 2021. "Business cycle in an oligopolistic economy with entry and exit," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    11. Pedro Jara-Moroni, 2008. "The Cournot outcome as the result of price competition," Working Papers halshs-00587866, HAL.
    12. Kaas, Leo & Madden, Paul, 2005. "Imperfectly competitive cycles with Keynesian and Walrasian features," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 861-886, May.
    13. Jacobs, Martin, 2016. "Number of firms, rationing, matching, and knowledge: A comprehensive study of variations in experimental Kreps-Scheinkman markets," Economics Working Papers 2016-02, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
    14. Massimo A. Francesco, 2014. "A Dynamic Entry And Price Game With Capacity Indivisibility," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(4), pages 406-419, October.
    15. Nicolas Gruyer, 2009. "A note on quantity precommitment, cournot outcome and asymmetric capacity costs," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(1), pages 384-391.
    16. A. Bërdëllima, 2021. "Duopoly price competition with limited capacity," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(1), pages 143-154, April.
    17. James D. Dana Jr. & Kevin R. Williams, 2018. "This paper develops an oligopoly model in which firms first choose capacity and then compete in prices in a series of advance-purchase markets. We show the existence of multiple sales opportunities cr," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2136R4, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 2021.
    18. Nicolas Gruyer, 2006. "Quantity precommitment, Cournot outcome and asymmetric capacity costs," Economics Working Papers 04, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school).
    19. Simon Loertscher, 2008. "Market Making Oligopoly," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(2), pages 263-289, June.
    20. James D. Dana & Kevin R. Williams, 2022. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Sequential Quantity-Price Games," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(5), pages 966-981, September.
    21. Massimo A. De Francesco, 2006. "Endogenous entry under Bertrand-Edgeworth and Cournot competition with capacity indivisibility," Department of Economics University of Siena 480, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    22. James D. Dana Jr. & Kevin R. Williams, 2018. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Sequential Quantity-Price Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2136R3, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Feb 2020.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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