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Licensing in the Context of Entrepreneurial University Activity: an Empirical Evidence and a Theoretical Model

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  • Elias Carayannis
  • Igor Dubina
  • Alina Ilinova

Abstract

US universities are leading the way in technology commercialization and licensing. This paper discusses the practice of licensing at the US universities, as well as the main directions and tasks of technology commercialization and licensing at the University of Maryland. Universities and research centers can implement steps to improve their technology commercialization and licensing negotiation by using solid analytical models. In the following sections, we suggest and describe a game-theoretic model to analyze, understand, and anticipate the behavioral profiles of inventors, entrepreneurs, and innovators on a dynamic interactive basis and in the context of a university or research center linkages with the market (of the innovation and entrepreneurship ecosystem) in pursuit of designing an optimal (or feasibly sub-optimal) licensing contract. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Elias Carayannis & Igor Dubina & Alina Ilinova, 2015. "Licensing in the Context of Entrepreneurial University Activity: an Empirical Evidence and a Theoretical Model," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 6(1), pages 1-12, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jknowl:v:6:y:2015:i:1:p:1-12
    DOI: 10.1007/s13132-014-0234-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Yuanyuan Chen & Wei Liu & Stavros Sindakis & Sakshi Aggarwal, 2024. "Transferring Scientific Knowledge to Academic Startups: the Moderating Effect of the Dual Identity of Academic Entrepreneurs on Forming Knowledge Depth and Knowledge Breadth," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 15(1), pages 1823-1844, March.
    2. Gabriele Santoro & Alberto Ferraris & Elisa Giacosa & Guido Giovando, 2018. "How SMEs Engage in Open Innovation: a Survey," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 9(2), pages 561-574, June.
    3. Arun Kumar A & Shekhar V, 2020. "SCL of Knowledge in Indian Universities," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 11(3), pages 1043-1058, September.
    4. Veronica Scuotto & Manlio Del Giudice & Elias G. Carayannis, 2017. "The effect of social networking sites and absorptive capacity on SMES’ innovation performance," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 409-424, April.
    5. Centobelli, Piera & Cerchione, Roberto & Esposito, Emilio & Shashi,, 2019. "Exploration and exploitation in the development of more entrepreneurial universities: A twisting learning path model of ambidexterity," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 172-194.
    6. Manlio Del Giudice & Elias G. Carayannis & Vincenzo Maggioni, 2017. "Global knowledge intensive enterprises and international technology transfer: emerging perspectives from a quadruple helix environment," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 229-235, April.
    7. Insu Cho & Young Hoon Kwak & Jaehyeon Jun, 2019. "Sustainable Idea Development Mechanism in University Technology Commercialization (UTC): Perspectives from Dynamic Capabilities Framework," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(21), pages 1-16, November.
    8. Jinshi Cheng & Bengang Gong & Bangyi Li, 2018. "Cooperation strategy of technology licensing based on evolutionary game," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 268(1), pages 387-404, September.
    9. Danutė Adomavičiūtė, 2018. "University’s Role and Influence for Professional Development in Public Administration Area," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 9(2), pages 703-719, June.

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