Author
Listed:
- Shuoqi Chen
(Postdoctoral Workstation)
- Longfei Ding
(Zhongnan University of Economics and Law)
- Yingbing Ni
(Macau University of Science and Technology)
Abstract
This research paper delves into the intricate relationship between government policies, corporate behavior, and labor investment efficiency (LIE) within the unique context of China’s transitional economy. Drawing on a sample of domestically listed non-financial A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2019, we find that government employment target pressure decreases corporate LIE, which derives from overinvestment in labor. Mechanical tests show that this government-corporate cooperation under government employment target pressure is resultant of the incentives for firms to obtain subsequent government support and for governments to achieve future social stability. Further analysis suggests that employment target pressure can also lead firms to increase low-quality human resources and decrease high-quality human resources. The negative effect of government employment target pressure on LIE is only present in local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms, and more pronounced when the mayor of the city where the enterprise is located is nearing retirement and when firms are facing greater pressure from industry competition. Our study extends the traditional agency theory framework, highlighting the interplay between government influences and corporate decision-making in economies where the government holds substantial influence. We explore how government employment targets, initially aimed at societal goals, intertwine with corporate strategies, shaping labor investment decisions. This research offers new perspectives on the drivers of corporate behavior and the optimization of labor investment strategies in the presence of political pressures. For managers, our findings underscore the need for a strategic approach that balances short-term compliance with government targets and long-term LIE. Policymakers can benefit from insights into the potential unintended consequences of government employment target pressure, encouraging the design of more effective policy frameworks that align short-term employment targets with long-term economic growth and resource optimization. This study contributes to the growing literature on government-corporate relationships and provides valuable insights into the complex interplay between government policies and corporate decision-making in a transitional economy like China.
Suggested Citation
Shuoqi Chen & Longfei Ding & Yingbing Ni, 2024.
"Government Employment Target Pressure and Labor Investment Efficiency in China: A Political Economy Perspective,"
Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 15(3), pages 11495-11532, September.
Handle:
RePEc:spr:jknowl:v:15:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s13132-023-01547-8
DOI: 10.1007/s13132-023-01547-8
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jknowl:v:15:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s13132-023-01547-8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through
the various RePEc services.