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The Non-cooperative Game and Cooperative Game Between Independent Innovation Firm and Imitative Innovation Firm

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  • Shaohua Qin

    (Luo Yang Normal University)

Abstract

We divide innovative firms into independent innovation firm and imitative innovation firm. In this paper, we study the game between independent and imitative innovative firms. Their games include non-cooperative games and cooperative games. Using the model, we argue that the optimal game strategy for independent and imitating innovators is to play a cooperative game. They will both get higher expected returns by playing a cooperative game. This is also the case in the long run. Cooperation should be an important option in the inter-firm game.

Suggested Citation

  • Shaohua Qin, 2024. "The Non-cooperative Game and Cooperative Game Between Independent Innovation Firm and Imitative Innovation Firm," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 15(2), pages 5443-5465, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jknowl:v:15:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s13132-023-01166-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s13132-023-01166-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rune Dahl Fitjar & Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, 2015. "Networking, context and firm-level innovation: Cooperation through the regional filter in Norway," Papers in Evolutionary Economic Geography (PEEG) 1516, Utrecht University, Department of Human Geography and Spatial Planning, Group Economic Geography, revised May 2015.
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    3. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(3), pages 383-401.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Independent innovation; Imitative innovation; Game; Cooperation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B21 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Microeconomics
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory

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