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The retention of CEOs that make poor acquisitions

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  • Carolyn Carroll
  • John Griffith

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  • Carolyn Carroll & John Griffith, 2008. "The retention of CEOs that make poor acquisitions," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 32(3), pages 226-242, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jecfin:v:32:y:2008:i:3:p:226-242
    DOI: 10.1007/s12197-007-9011-5
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    14. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
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    17. Choi, Dosoung, 1991. "Toehold Acquisitions, Shareholder Wealth, and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(3), pages 391-407, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    White knights; Tobin’s q ; CEOs; G34;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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