From “prudent man” to homo oeconomicus: Does historicity matter for the category of individualism?

Individualism and individualization processes uniquely characterize the birth and development of modernity (Burckhardt; Horkheimer; Taylor). The literature on this topic is endless, even though the impression persists of profound and significant uncertainties concerning the category of individualism. A rapid look at some of the authors who have analyzed the features of modern individualism shows the non-episodic character of the discontent about it. In 1904–1905, Weber observed the difficulty of a univocal definition of “the term ‘individualism’,” which “embraces the utmost heterogeneity of meanings.” In 1930, Dewey manifested his preoccupation with reference to the old category, emphasizing its inadequacy for the solution of the current problems, since it had produced a true “perversion of the whole ideal of individualism” (Dewey). In 1945, Hayek showed his bewilderment about the astonishing “confusion about the meaning of individualism” a category “abused and … misunderstood,” “distorted … into an unrecognizable caricature” by its critics and its followers. More recently, Lukes recalls the difficulty of disentangling the “rich semantic history” of individualism, while Elliot and Ch. Lemert focus on the complexity of the “many selves,” making univocal meanings problematic. Obviously, in this paper we cannot give responses to the vast array of questions linked to the analysis of individualism. Our limited purpose is to go back to a crucial moment in the reflection on individualism, where a strong divergence between two models of individualism arose: Smith’s “historically oriented” inquiry and Mill’s aprioristic analysis. As a result, we will reflect on the following aspects: (1) the rich inquiry into modern individualism carried on by A. Smith, in the context of the Enlightenment; (2) Smith’s attempt to problematically connect modern individualism and the original features of “commercial society”; (3) the approach of J. Stuart Mill, who departs from the Smithian historical analysis, through the definition of “homo oeconomicus,” and moves into a naturalistic economic space.