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Exploring Coase’s world: an introduction

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  • A. Nicita
  • M. Rizzolli
  • H. Smith

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  • A. Nicita & M. Rizzolli & H. Smith, 2012. "Exploring Coase’s world: an introduction," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 59(2), pages 111-120, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:59:y:2012:i:2:p:111-120
    DOI: 10.1007/s12232-012-0163-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    2. R. H. Coase, 2013. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(4), pages 837-877.
    3. Ugo Pagano, 2012. "No institution is a free lunch: a reconstruction of Ronald Coase," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 59(2), pages 189-200, July.
    4. Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, 2002. "The Meaning of Property Rights: Law versus Economics?," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 78(3), pages 317-330.
    5. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, 2006. "Regulation, Competition and Liberalization," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(2), pages 325-366, June.
    6. Antonio Nicita & Matteo Rizzolli, 2012. "Hold-up and externality: the firm as a nexus of incomplete rights?," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 59(2), pages 157-174, July.
    7. Nuno Garoupa, 2012. "Ronald Coase and law and economics in Europe," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 59(2), pages 223-229, July.
    8. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    9. Brian Lee & Henry Smith, 2012. "The nature of Coasean property," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 59(2), pages 145-155, July.
    10. Benito Arruñada, 2012. "Property as an economic concept: reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 59(2), pages 121-144, July.
    11. Filippo Belloc & Antonio Nicita, 2011. "The political determinants of liberalization: do ideological cleavages still matter?," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 58(2), pages 121-145, June.
    12. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    13. Simmons, Beth A. & Elkins, Zachary, 2004. "The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(1), pages 171-189, February.
    14. Barbara Luppi & Francesco Parisi, 2012. "Politics with(out) Coase," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 59(2), pages 175-187, July.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coase; Property rights; Theory of the firm; In rem; Transaction costs; L14; L50; K11; K12; K23;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law

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