IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/hecrev/v8y2018i1d10.1186_s13561-018-0213-7.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A survey-based design of a pricing system for psychotherapy

Author

Listed:
  • Beat Hulliger

    (University of Applied Sciences and Arts Northwestern Switzerland (FHNW))

  • Martin Sterchi

    (University of Applied Sciences and Arts Northwestern Switzerland (FHNW))

Abstract

For admission to statutory health insurance, it is common in Switzerland that health care providers negotiate prices for health care services directly with health insurers. Once they agree upon a price, they must submit the resulting price to the Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH), which can then authorize it. Swiss law requires the prices in health care to be based on empirical data. There has been little research on how to derive such a price for health care from empirical data and which data should be used. Based on a collaboration with psychological psychotherapists in Switzerland, we have designed a pricing system. The empirical basis were two representative surveys: a survey about costs and earnings of psychotherapists, as well as a time-use survey for psychotherapy. This paper shows the methodology followed to establish an empirically based pricing system. The paper may serve as a practical guide for health service providers who want to develop a pricing system. Our approach offers a high degree of freedom because it involves the collection of the data and an explicit modelling phase. At the same time, it might be more resource intensive than other approaches that are based on existing data sources.

Suggested Citation

  • Beat Hulliger & Martin Sterchi, 2018. "A survey-based design of a pricing system for psychotherapy," Health Economics Review, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 1-11, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:hecrev:v:8:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1186_s13561-018-0213-7
    DOI: 10.1186/s13561-018-0213-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1186/s13561-018-0213-7
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1186/s13561-018-0213-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Zweifel, Peter & Manning, Willard G., 2000. "Moral hazard and consumer incentives in health care," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 8, pages 409-459, Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stefan Boes & Michael Gerfin, 2016. "Does Full Insurance Increase the Demand for Health Care?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(11), pages 1483-1496, November.
    2. Minke Remmerswaal & Jan Boone & Rudy Douven, 2019. "Selection and moral hazard effects in healthcare," CPB Discussion Paper 393.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    3. Michael Smart & Mark Stabile, 2005. "Tax credits, insurance, and the use of medical care," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(2), pages 345-365, May.
    4. Seres, Gyula & Balleyer, Anna Helen & Cerutti, Nicola & Danilov, Anastasia & Friedrichsen, Jana & Liu, Yiming & Süer, Müge, 2021. "Face masks increase compliance with physical distancing recommendations during the COVID-19 pandemic," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 7(2), pages 139-158.
    5. R. Vincent Pohl, 2018. "Medicaid And The Labor Supply Of Single Mothers: Implications For Health Care Reform," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(3), pages 1283-1313, August.
    6. Ellis, Randall P. & Manning, Willard G., 2007. "Optimal health insurance for prevention and treatment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1128-1150, December.
    7. K. P. M. Winssen & R. C. Kleef & W. P. M. M. Ven, 2017. "A voluntary deductible in health insurance: the more years you opt for it, the lower your premium?," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 18(2), pages 209-226, March.
    8. Gao, Qiuming & Wang, Derek, 2021. "Hospital efficiency and equity in health care delivery: A study based in China," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    9. Fischer, Barbara & Telser, Harry & Zweifel, Peter, 2018. "End-of-life healthcare expenditure: Testing economic explanations using a discrete choice experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 30-38.
    10. Wang, Tianyu & Wen, Ke & Gao, Qiuming & Sun, Ruochen, 2023. "Small money, big change: The distributional impact of differentiated doctor's visit fee on healthcare utilization," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 339(C).
    11. Udo Schneider & Jürgen Zerth, 2011. "Improving Prevention Compliance through Appropriate Incentives: Theoretical Modelling and Empirical Evidence," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 147(I), pages 71-106, March.
    12. Russ Kashian & Nicholas Lovett & Yuhan Xue, 2020. "Has the affordable care act affected health care efficiency?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 58(2), pages 193-233, December.
    13. H. E. Frech & Peter Zweifel, 2017. "Market Socialism and Community Rating in Health Insurance," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 59(3), pages 405-427, September.
    14. Kurt Lavetti & Thomas DeLeire & Nicolas R. Ziebarth, 2023. "How do low‐income enrollees in the Affordable Care Act marketplaces respond to cost‐sharing?," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 90(1), pages 155-183, March.
    15. Hendrik Jürges, 2017. "Financial incentives, timing of births, and infant health: a closer look into the delivery room," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 18(2), pages 195-208, March.
    16. Andreas Werblow, 2002. "Alles nur Selektion?: Der Einfluss von Selbstbehalten in der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 71(4), pages 427-436.
    17. Ha Trong Nguyen & Luke B Connelly, 2017. "Cost-sharing in health insurance and its impact in a developing country: evidence from a quasi-natural experiment," Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre Working Paper series WP1702, Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre (BCEC), Curtin Business School.
    18. Dardanoni, Valentino & Li Donni, Paolo, 2012. "Incentive and selection effects of Medigap insurance on inpatient care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 457-470.
    19. Felder, Stefan & Werblow, Andreas & Zweifel, Peter, 2010. "Do red herrings swim in circles? Controlling for the endogeneity of time to death," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 205-212, March.
    20. David M. Cutler, 2002. "Equality, Efficiency, and Market Fundamentals: The Dynamics of International Medical-Care Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(3), pages 881-906, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:hecrev:v:8:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1186_s13561-018-0213-7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/13561 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.