Evolutionary Stability in the Ultimatum Game
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1008728906472
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- Napel, Stefan, 2003. "Aspiration adaptation in the ultimatum minigame," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 86-106, April.
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More about this item
Keywords
evolutionary stability; ultimatum game; fairness; JEL classification; C72;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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