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Discrepant Values and Measures of Negotiator Performance

Author

Listed:
  • Dana R. Clyman

    (University of Virginia)

  • Thomas M. Tripp

    (Washington State University)

Abstract

The thesis of the paper is that measuring negotiator performance correctly is difficult because the values that those of us who measure negotiator performance think negotiators are maximizing may differ from the values negotiators are actually maximizing. When such discrepant values exist, using performance measures that do not account for them can lead easily to incorrect conclusions about negotiator performance. Indeed, good performance may be judged poor, and vice-versa. This paper explores several related literatures, including the experimental-bargaining, behavioral-decision-making, and procedural-justice literatures, to demonstrate that discrepant values exist. It then demonstrates that whenever performance measures are used as dependent variables in negotiation experiments, the existence of discrepant values can lead to both Type I and Type II construct-validity errors.

Suggested Citation

  • Dana R. Clyman & Thomas M. Tripp, 2000. "Discrepant Values and Measures of Negotiator Performance," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 251-274, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:9:y:2000:i:4:d:10.1023_a:1008717307156
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1008717307156
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Allred, Keith G. & Mallozzi, John S. & Matsui, Fusako & Raia, Christopher P., 1997. "The Influence of Anger and Compassion on Negotiation Performance," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 175-187, June.
    3. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
    4. Tripp, Thomas M. & Sondak, Harris, 1992. "An evaluation of dependent variables in experimental negotiation studies: Impasse rates and pareto efficiency," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 273-295, March.
    5. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stephen E. Weiss, 2012. "Negotiators’ Effectiveness with Mixed Agendas: An Empirical Exploration of Tasks, Decisions and Performance Criteria," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 255-290, May.
    2. Gregory E. Kersten, 2001. "Modeling Distributive and Integrative Negotiations. Review and Revised Characterization," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(6), pages 493-514, November.

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