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A Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Approach for Conflict Resolution in Multi-agent Planning

Author

Listed:
  • Jaume Jordán

    (Universitat Politècnica de València)

  • Alejandro Torreño

    (Universitat Politècnica de València)

  • Mathijs Weerdt

    (Delft University of Technology)

  • Eva Onaindia

    (Universitat Politècnica de València)

Abstract

This paper presents FENOCOP, a game-theoretic approach for solving non-cooperative planning problems that involve a set of self-interested agents. Each agent wants to execute its own plan in a shared environment but the plans may be rendered infeasible by the appearance of potential conflicts; agents are willing to coordinate their plans in order to avoid conflicts during a joint execution. In order to attain a conflict-free combination of plans, agents must postpone the execution of some of their actions, which negatively affects their individual utilities. FENOCOP is a two-level game approach: the General Game selects a Nash equilibrium among several combinations of plans, and the Scheduling Game generates, for a combination of plans, an executable outcome by introducing delays in the agents’ plans. For the Scheduling Game, we developed two algorithms that return a Pareto optimal and fair equilibrium from which no agent would be willing to deviate.

Suggested Citation

  • Jaume Jordán & Alejandro Torreño & Mathijs Weerdt & Eva Onaindia, 2021. "A Non-cooperative Game-Theoretic Approach for Conflict Resolution in Multi-agent Planning," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 7-41, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:30:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-020-09703-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-020-09703-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Myerson, Roger B, 1981. "Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 883-897, June.
    2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, April.
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