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Advances in Drama Theory for Managing Global Hazards and Disasters. Part I: Theoretical Foundation

Author

Listed:
  • Jason K. Levy

    (Virginia Commonwealth University)

  • Keith W. Hipel

    (University of Waterloo)

  • N. Howard

    (Sheffield Hallam University)

Abstract

Global risk and disaster management challenges are complex and ill-structured group decision processes characterized by time-sensitive, multi-faceted, and self-organizing negotiations, high decision stakes, extreme uncertainty, and dynamic, value-laden tradeoffs. Drama theory asserts that conflict resolution requires players to engage in a rational-emotional process of re-defining both the game and their “positions” in it until agreement on a satisfactory resolution is reached. While game theory has been widely applied to problems dealing with hazards, risk, and disasters, it assumes fixed players, options, and preferences, and hence does not allow for the re-definition of the conflict under consideration. Results show that drama theory constitutes a flexible and powerful tool for modeling group decision and negotiation processes involving natural, man-made, and health-related hazards, risk, and catastrophes in the post-911 security environment by modeling emotional responses that, throughout the course of a game, can lead to unanticipated reactions and change basic assumptions. This is achieved through the use of option boards to construct and analyze emergency, disaster, or crisis models that are structurally similar to game models. Finally, drama theory is compared and contrasted to conflict analysis, which developed from common roots in metagame analysis. The strengths and weaknesses of drama theory are critically evaluated in the context of global climate change and the mounting risk of a worldwide influenza pandemic.

Suggested Citation

  • Jason K. Levy & Keith W. Hipel & N. Howard, 2009. "Advances in Drama Theory for Managing Global Hazards and Disasters. Part I: Theoretical Foundation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 303-316, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:18:y:2009:i:4:d:10.1007_s10726-008-9145-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-008-9145-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Seaberg & Laura Devine & Jun Zhuang, 2017. "A review of game theory applications in natural disaster management research," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 89(3), pages 1461-1483, December.
    2. Suman Sensarma & Norio Okada, 2010. "Redefining the Game in Local Water Management Conflict: A Case Study," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 24(15), pages 4307-4316, December.
    3. Rajneesh Chowdhury & Nihar Jangle, 2018. "Critical Systems Thinking Towards Enhancing Community Engagement in Micro-insurance," Global Journal of Flexible Systems Management, Springer;Global Institute of Flexible Systems Management, vol. 19(3), pages 209-224, September.
    4. Cecilia Rossignoli & Francesca Ricciardi & Sabrina Bonomi, 2018. "Organizing for Commons-Enabling Decision-Making Under Conflicting Institutional Logics in Social Entrepreneurship," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(3), pages 417-443, June.
    5. Bismark Appiah Addae & Weiming Wang & Haiyan Xu & Mohammad Reza Feylizadeh, 2021. "Sustainable Evaluation of Factors Affecting Energy-Resource Conflict in the Western Region of Ghana Using Large Group-DEMATEL," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 847-877, August.

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