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Politics and finance: a study on the impact of campaign donations on Brazilian firms

Author

Listed:
  • Mariana G. Davi

    (Banco Cooperativo Sicredi)

  • Marcelo S. Portugal

    (Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS))

Abstract

This paper aims to identify potential benefits obtained by companies for their contributions to political campaigns. We used an extensive database with information on donations to House, Senate, and Presidency candidates in the 2006 and 2010 elections. The variables of interest analyzed were the cumulative abnormal return by the time the results of each election became known and the return on equity in the year following the elections. Panel regressions were estimated as ordinary least squares, and fixed effects of year and industry were included. The results indicate that not only does the market anticipate future benefits for companies that contributed to campaigns—which is reflected in positive cumulative abnormal returns at the announcement of the election results—but these companies also have higher returns on equity than those that were not involved in the political process. In addition, donations to winning candidates generate higher returns than donations to losing candidates, which supports the return of favors hypothesis. Similarly, contributions to candidates affiliated with the president’s coalitions also had a higher impact when compared to donations to political opponents, as did donations to left-wing parties.

Suggested Citation

  • Mariana G. Davi & Marcelo S. Portugal, 2020. "Politics and finance: a study on the impact of campaign donations on Brazilian firms," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 1057-1105, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:empeco:v:58:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s00181-018-1594-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s00181-018-1594-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Zhang, Kaixia & Li, Weibing, 2024. "Understanding the puzzle of polluting companies' social responsibility," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Campaign contributions; Fixed effects; Cumulative abnormal return; Return on equity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance

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