IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/elcore/v22y2022i4d10.1007_s10660-021-09462-3.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Intermediation in reward-based crowdfunding: a cash deposit mechanism to reduce moral hazard

Author

Listed:
  • E. Erjiang

    (Tsinghua University)

  • Ming Yu

    (Tsinghua University)

  • Geng Peng

    (University of Chinese Academy of Sciences)

Abstract

A major impediment to crowdfunding is the unobservable actions initiated by an entrepreneur, which generally results in moral hazard. This study aims to demonstrate how an online intermediary, functioning as a crowdfunding platform, can reduce the moral hazard problem by designing a cash deposit mechanism. A model that illustrates the relationship among a crowdfunding platform, an entrepreneur and various consumers is built. With crowdfunding, an entrepreneur can ask a large audience to back up his/her project with money and then reward each funder with a product. The quality of the product depends on the combined effort of the entrepreneur and pure luck. Our results show that for projects with a high marginal cost of effort and low difference in quality, the crowdfunding platform tends to set a high compensation ratio and implement strict control of the starting capital. The crowdfunding platform prefers projects with a low marginal cost of effort and high difference in quality due to the higher amount of financing. The major findings indicate that crowdfunding platforms can reduce moral hazard by setting up a cash deposit mechanism. However, this mechanism exhibits limitations in projects with high fixed costs, that is, the effort cannot reach the constrained first-best level. For projects with a high marginal cost of effort or low difference in quality, this mechanism will reduce social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • E. Erjiang & Ming Yu & Geng Peng, 2022. "Intermediation in reward-based crowdfunding: a cash deposit mechanism to reduce moral hazard," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 1227-1248, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:elcore:v:22:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s10660-021-09462-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s10660-021-09462-3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10660-021-09462-3
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10660-021-09462-3?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Vogel, Rick & Puhan, Tatjana Xenia & Shehu, Edlira & Kliger, Doron & Beese, Henning, 2014. "Funding decisions and entrepreneurial team diversity: A field study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 107(PB), pages 595-613.
    2. Kihlstrom, Richard E. & Matthews, Steven A., 1990. "Managerial incentives in an entrepreneurial stock market model," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 57-79, March.
    3. Biglaiser, Gary & Friedman, James W., 1994. "Middlemen as guarantors of quality," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 509-531, December.
    4. Roland Strausz, 2017. "A Theory of Crowdfunding: A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1430-1476, June.
    5. Terry A. Taylor, 2002. "Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(8), pages 992-1007, August.
    6. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
    7. John Kambhu, 1982. "Optimal Product Quality under Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 483-492, Autumn.
    8. Strausz, Roland, 2017. "A Theory of Crowdfunding," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 2, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    9. Mollick, Ethan, 2014. "The dynamics of crowdfunding: An exploratory study," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-16.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Matthew Ellman & Sjaak Hurkens, 2017. "A Theory of Crowdfunding -A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard: Comment," Working Papers 1012, Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Tuo Gladys & Yi Feng & Sarpong Solomon & Wang Wenxin, 2020. "The Second Round Resource Acquisition of Entrepreneurial Crowdfunded Ventures: The Relevance of Campaign and Project Implementation Performance Outcomes," Entrepreneurship Research Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 10(3), pages 1-21, July.
    3. Fang, Xing, 2022. "Why we hide good deeds? The selfless and anonymous donation behavior in crowdfunding," Technology in Society, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    4. Gilles Chemla & Katrin Tinn, 2020. "Learning Through Crowdfunding," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 1783-1801, May.
    5. Thomas Stebro & Manuel Fernnndez Sierra & Stefano Lovo & Nir Vulkan, 2017. "Herding in Equity Crowdfunding," Working Papers hal-01970724, HAL.
    6. Massimo G. Colombo & Kourosh Shafi, 2021. "Receiving external equity following successfully crowdfunded technological projects: an informational mechanism," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1507-1529, April.
    7. Damien Besancenot & Radu Vranceanu, 2018. "Crowdfunding with overenthusiastic investors : a global game model," Working Papers hal-01718793, HAL.
    8. Mahmood, Ammara & Luffarelli, Jonathan & Mukesh, Mudra, 2019. "What's in a logo? The impact of complex visual cues in equity crowdfunding," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 41-62.
    9. Saurav Chandra Talukder & Zoltán Lakner, 2023. "Exploring the Landscape of Social Entrepreneurship and Crowdfunding: A Bibliometric Analysis," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(12), pages 1-22, June.
    10. Joyee Deb & Aniko Oery & Kevin R. Williams, 2018. "Aiming for the Goal: Contribution Dynamics of Crowdfunding," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2149R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jan 2021.
    11. Matthew Ellman & Michele Fabi, 2022. "A Theory of Crowdfunding Dynamics," Working Papers 1349, Barcelona School of Economics.
    12. Ellman, Matthew & Hurkens, Sjaak, 2019. "Optimal crowdfunding design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    13. Stefano Cascino & Maria Correia & Ane Tamayo, 2019. "Does Consumer Protection Enhance Disclosure Credibility in Reward Crowdfunding?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(5), pages 1247-1302, December.
    14. Adena, Maja & Huck, Steffen, 2022. "Voluntary ‘donations’ versus reward-oriented ‘contributions’: two experiments on framing in funding mechanisms," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 25(5), pages 1399-1417.
    15. Lv, Jiancheng & Bi, Gongbing & Xu, Yang, 2023. "Crowdfunding pricing and quality overstatement in the presence of platform regulation," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    16. Regner, Tobias & Crosetto, Paolo, 2021. "The long-term effects of self pledging in reward crowdfunding," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 165(C).
    17. Sylvain Dejean, 2020. "The role of distance and social networks in the geography of crowdfunding: evidence from France," Regional Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 54(3), pages 329-339, March.
    18. Felipe, Israel José dos Santos & Mendes-Da-Silva, Wesley & Leal, Cristiana Cerqueira & Braun Santos, Danilo, 2022. "Reward crowdfunding campaigns: Time-to-success analysis," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 214-228.
    19. Sha Zhou & Tao Ma & Zhengchi Liu, 2021. "Crowdfunding as a screener for collective investment," Electronic Commerce Research, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 195-221, March.
    20. Andrej Woerner & Sander Onderstal & Arthur Schram, 2022. "Comparing Crowdfunding Mechanisms: Introducing the Generalized Moulin-Shenker Mechanism," CESifo Working Paper Series 10081, CESifo.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:elcore:v:22:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s10660-021-09462-3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.