IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/dyngam/v13y2023i3d10.1007_s13235-022-00484-6.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On a Constrained Infinite-Time Horizon Linear Quadratic Game

Author

Listed:
  • Mikhail I. Krastanov

    (Sofia University
    Institute of Mathematics and Informatics, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)

  • Rossen Rozenov

    (International Monetary Fund)

  • Boyan K. Stefanov

    (Sofia University
    Institute of Mathematics and Informatics, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)

Abstract

A linear quadratic differential game on an infinite-time horizon is studied in the case when the controls of the minimizing player are subject to constraints. A sufficient condition for a saddle point equilibrium is provided based on the conversion of the infinite-time horizon game to a game on a finite-time horizon. The method is applied to a simple monetary policy model as an illustrative example.

Suggested Citation

  • Mikhail I. Krastanov & Rossen Rozenov & Boyan K. Stefanov, 2023. "On a Constrained Infinite-Time Horizon Linear Quadratic Game," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 843-858, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:13:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s13235-022-00484-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-022-00484-6
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13235-022-00484-6
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s13235-022-00484-6?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. S. J. Rubio, 2006. "On Coincidence of Feedback Nash Equilibria and Stackelberg Equilibria in Economic Applications of Differential Games," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 203-220, January.
    2. Dennis, Richard & Leitemo, Kai & Söderström, Ulf, 2009. "Methods for robust control," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1604-1616, August.
    3. Alexei Onatski & Noah Williams, 2003. "Modeling Model Uncertainty," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(5), pages 1087-1122, September.
    4. Marc P. Giannoni, 2007. "Robust optimal monetary policy in a forward-looking model with parameter and shock uncertainty," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(1), pages 179-213.
    5. Jacob Engwerda, 2022. "Min-Max Robust Control in LQ-Differential Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 1221-1279, December.
    6. Dockner,Engelbert J. & Jorgensen,Steffen & Long,Ngo Van & Sorger,Gerhard, 2000. "Differential Games in Economics and Management Science," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521637329, September.
    7. Michael Woodford, 2003. "Optimal Interest-Rate Smoothing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(4), pages 861-886.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hasui Kohei, 2021. "Trend Growth and Robust Monetary Policy," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 21(2), pages 449-472, June.
    2. Brock, William A. & Durlauf, Steven N. & West, Kenneth D., 2007. "Model uncertainty and policy evaluation: Some theory and empirics," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 136(2), pages 629-664, February.
    3. Mariusz Gorajski, 2016. "Robust monetary policy in a linear model of the polish economy: is the uncertainty in the model responsible for the interest rate smoothing effect?," Lodz Economics Working Papers 1/2016, University of Lodz, Faculty of Economics and Sociology.
    4. Kohei Hasui, 2021. "How robustness can change the desirability of speed limit policy," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 68(5), pages 553-570, November.
    5. Vitale, Paolo, 2018. "Optimal monetary policy for a pessimistic central bank," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 39-59.
    6. Mariusz Górajski, 2018. "Robust Monetary Policy in a Model of the Polish Economy: Is the Uncertainty Responsible for the Interest Rate Smoothing Effect?," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 52(2), pages 313-340, August.
    7. Paulo R. Mota & Abel L. C. Fernandes, 2019. "The Dynamic Adjustment Of Central Banks’ Target Interest Rate: The Case Of The Ecb," FEP Working Papers 613, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    8. Alexander Moll & Meir Pachter & Eloy Garcia & David Casbeer & Dejan Milutinović, 2020. "Robust Policies for a Multiple-Pursuer Single-Evader Differential Game," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 202-221, March.
    9. José Daniel López-Barrientos & Ekaterina Viktorovna Gromova & Ekaterina Sergeevna Miroshnichenko, 2020. "Resource Exploitation in a Stochastic Horizon under Two Parametric Interpretations," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(7), pages 1-29, July.
    10. Richard Dennis, 2007. "Model uncertainty and monetary policy," Working Paper Series 2007-09, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    11. Caputo, Michael R. & Ling, Chen, 2013. "The intrinsic comparative dynamics of locally differentiable feedback Nash equilibria of autonomous and exponentially discounted infinite horizon differential games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(10), pages 1982-1994.
    12. Keith Kuester & Volker Wieland, 2010. "Insurance Policies for Monetary Policy in the Euro Area," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(4), pages 872-912, June.
    13. van der Ploeg, Frederick, 2004. "Prudent Monetary Policy: Applications of Cautious LQG Control and Prediction," CEPR Discussion Papers 4222, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Marine Charlotte André & Meixing Dai, 2017. "Can inflation contract discipline central bankers when agents are learning?," Working Papers of BETA 2017-25, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    15. Leitemo, Kai & Söderström, Ulf, 2008. "Robust monetary policy in a small open economy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(10), pages 3218-3252, October.
    16. Robert Tetlow & Peter von zur Muehlen, 2004. "Avoiding Nash Inflation: Bayesian and Robus Responses to Model Uncertainty," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 7(4), pages 869-899, October.
    17. Brock,W.A. & Durlauf,S.N., 2004. "Macroeconomics and model uncertainty," Working papers 20, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    18. Jean-Guillaume Sahuc, 2003. "Robust European monetary policy rules," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(14), pages 889-894.
    19. Mariusz Górajski & Zbigniew Kuchta, 2022. "Which hallmarks of optimal monetary policy rules matter in Poland? A stochastic dominance approach," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 53(2), pages 149-182.
    20. Giannoni, Marc P., 2014. "Optimal interest-rate rules and inflation stabilization versus price-level stabilization," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 110-129.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Differential games; Linear quadratic optimal control; Model uncertainty; Robustness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:13:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s13235-022-00484-6. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.