Competition Among Conventions
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1009646410168
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- Joerg Oechssler, 1993. "Competition among Conventions," Game Theory and Information 9312001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 04 Dec 1993.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Oechssler, Jorg, 1997.
"Decentralization and the coordination problem,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 119-135, January.
- Joerg Oechssler, 1994. "Decentralization and the Coordination Problem," Game Theory and Information 9403004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Oechssler, Jorg, 1997.
"An Evolutionary Interpretation of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 203-237, October.
- Joerg Oechssler, 1994. "An Evolutionary Interpretation Of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria," Game Theory and Information 9404001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Massimiliano Landi & Pier Luigi Sacco, 2001. "Norms of Cooperation in a Game of Partnership," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 233-266, October.
- Simon Weidenholzer, 2010. "Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature," Games, MDPI, vol. 1(4), pages 1-35, November.
- Hojman, Daniel A. & Szeidl, Adam, 2006. "Endogenous networks, social games, and evolution," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 112-130, April.
- Neary, Philip R., 2012. "Competing conventions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 301-328.
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More about this item
Keywords
evolutionary game theory; viscosity; efficiency; endogenous interaction;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
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