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Governance matters: climate change, corruption, and livelihoods in Bangladesh

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  • Md. Ashiqur Rahman

    (University of South Florida)

Abstract

In world climate science, Bangladesh is considered a poster child of vulnerability. The primary stressors that affect the vulnerability of the Bangladeshi population include sea-level rise, biodiversity degradation, saltwater intrusion, desertification, social exclusion, unstable political conditions, and weak governance systems. Governance is an important non-climatic stressor that has not received sufficient attention. Within this framework, this paper explores the impacts of bribery and extortion on livelihoods and adaptive capacity in the face of climate change and argues that corruption significantly reduces the ability to respond to climatic stressors. Findings draw attention to this critical issue in climate change adaptation and international development in general, particularly for developing countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Md. Ashiqur Rahman, 2018. "Governance matters: climate change, corruption, and livelihoods in Bangladesh," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 313-326, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:climat:v:147:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10584-018-2139-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10584-018-2139-9
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