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How do loyalty programs affect goodwill? An optimal control approach

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  • Mariusz Górajski

    (University of Łódź)

  • Dominika Machowska

    (University of Łódź)

Abstract

This paper examines the long-term impact of loyalty programs on a company’s profit and reputation among customers, and with different durations of product use. We analyze how the launch of loyalty programs may change the profitability of optimal advertising activities. The basis of this study is a modified goodwill model where the market is segmented according to usage experience. The main novelty is the role of loyalty programs and consumer recommendations in the creation of product goodwill, and also their influence on optimal advertising. The dynamics of goodwill are described by a partial differential equation. The firm maximizes the sum of discounted profits by choosing a different advertising campaign for each market segment. For a high-quality product, we observe that there is a trade off between the loyalty program and optimal advertising strategies. For a low-quality product, the loyalty program causes more profitable companies to invest heavily in additional advertising efforts.

Suggested Citation

  • Mariusz Górajski & Dominika Machowska, 2019. "How do loyalty programs affect goodwill? An optimal control approach," 4OR, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 297-316, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:aqjoor:v:17:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s10288-018-0386-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s10288-018-0386-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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