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NIMBY (not in my backyard) conflicts: a simple game-theoretic analysis

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  • Sen Eguchi

    (Niigata Sangyo University)

Abstract

This study addresses so-called NIMBY (not in my backyard) conflicts around the siting of a facility that produces local public goods/services for the residents of one region but transfers the environmental costs to surrounding areas (subregions). Residents usually agree on the need for such a NIMBY facility but oppose its construction in their neighborhood, making the siting of the facility difficult. Assuming a region with a local government and two areas having one resident each, we formulate a two-person normal form game in which the government sites a new NIMBY facility in either of the two areas while considering the residents’ opinions on the most suitable site for the facility. Our analysis shows that in such a game, residents experience either the Prisoner’s Dilemma or War of Attrition, leading to the emergence of NIMBY conflicts.

Suggested Citation

  • Sen Eguchi, 2020. "NIMBY (not in my backyard) conflicts: a simple game-theoretic analysis," Asia-Pacific Journal of Regional Science, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 821-833, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:apjors:v:4:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s41685-020-00166-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s41685-020-00166-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kunreuther, Howard & Kleindorfer, Paul R, 1986. "A Sealed-Bid Auction Mechanism for Siting Noxious Facilities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 295-299, May.
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    5. Martin Besfamille & Jean-Marie Lozachmeur, 2010. "NIMBY and mechanism design under different constitutional constraints," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 17(2), pages 114-132, April.
    6. Frey, Bruno S & Oberholzer-Gee, Felix & Eichenberger, Reiner, 1996. "The Old Lady Visits Your Backyard: A Tale of Morals and Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(6), pages 1297-1313, December.
    7. Per Fredriksson, 2000. "The Siting of Hazardous Waste Facilities in Federal Systems: The Political Economy of NIMBY," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 15(1), pages 75-87, January.
    8. Greg Flynn, 2011. "Court Decisions, NIMBY Claims, and the Siting of Unwanted Facilities: Policy Frames and the Impact of Judicialization in Locating a Landfill for Toronto's Solid Waste," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 37(3), pages 381-393, September.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Hui Zhao & Yuanyuan Ge & Jingqi Zhang, 2022. "Evaluation on the implementation effect of public participation in the decision-making of NIMBY facilities," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 17(2), pages 1-29, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    NIMBY; Game theory; Prisoner’s dilemma; War of attrition; War on garbage;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • R53 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Public Facility Location Analysis; Public Investment and Capital Stock

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