Theology and agricultural ethics at state universities: A rejoinder

Michael Eldridge's critique of the author's earlier paper on the place of theology in agricultural ethics at state universities fails in at least three places: (1) Eldridge presents an inadequate picture of how basic assumptions function in human thinking and misuses terms like “public,” “private,” “particular,” “empirical,” and “common experience”; (2) he wrongly distinguishes between philosophers and theologians on the bais of their openness to new data, ideas, and public criticism; (3) he misunderstands the meaning of the First Amendment. Baer argues that whenever faculty at a state university deal with the Big Questions—who we are, how we should live, and what it all means—they must be seen, for First Amendment purposes, as operating within the realm of religion. Without such a functional definition of religion, the state will inevitably give unfair advantage to nontheistic, secular answers to the Big Questions. Eldridge is wrong to claim that Dewey escapes the liabilities of particularity and parochialism in a way that theologians do not. He also misunderstands the nature of the First Amendment when he argues that public schools may legitimately propagate Dewey's naturalistic variety of “religion.” Baer claims that when state universities address the Big Questions, the demands of public justice will be met only if theologians participate in the discussion and debate. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989