IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sgh/gosnar/y2015i2p79-111.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Unikanie opodatkowania w firmach rodzinnych notowanych na Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie

Author

Listed:
  • Michał Kałdoński

Abstract

Celem artykułu jest próba znalezienia odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy pomiędzy grupą spółek rodzinnych a grupą spółek nierodzinnych notowanych na GPW w Warszawie występują istotne różnice w zakresie skali oraz czynników wpływających na natężenie zjawiska ucieczki przed podatkiem. Wykorzystując długoterminową miarę natężenia unikania opodatkowania jaką jest trzyletnia gotówkowa stopa podatku dochodowego wykazano, że publiczne firmy rodzinne charakteryzują się większą skalą ucieczki przed podatkiem niż spółki nierodzinne. Podatek dochodowy płacony przez firmy rodzinne jest o ponad 4 punkty procentowe niższy niż podatek płacony przez spółki nierodzinne. Zaprezentowane w opracowaniu wyniki badań dostarczają argumentów na rzecz hipotezy, że w przypadku unikania opodatkowania przez firmy rodzinne oszczędności podatkowe oraz prywatne korzyści z kontroli przypadające akcjonariuszom sprawującym kontrolę są większe aniżeli koszty transakcyjne, potencjalne dyskonto w wycenie, kary nakładane przez administrację skarbową czy koszty utraty reputacji. W grupie firm rodzinnych, większą skalą ucieczki przed podatkiem charakteryzują się przede wszystkim spółki zdywersyfikowane oraz spółki niezależne od finansowania zewnętrznego. Wśród firm rodzinnych, relatywnie wysokim poziomem natężenia unikania opodatkowania charakteryzują się także spółki nieprzejrzyste i spółki wykorzystujące akcje ze zróżnicowanym prawem głosu. Dywersyfikacja oraz niezależność finansowa ograniczają koszty ucieczki przed podatkiem, z kolei brak transparentności i akcje ze zróżnicowanym prawem głosu sprzyjają osiąganiu prywatnych korzyści z kontroli pod pretekstem unikania opodatkowania.

Suggested Citation

  • Michał Kałdoński, 2015. "Unikanie opodatkowania w firmach rodzinnych notowanych na Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 2, pages 79-111.
  • Handle: RePEc:sgh:gosnar:y:2015:i:2:p:79-111
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.journalssystem.com/gna/pdf-100828-33092
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Desai, Mihir A. & Dharmapala, Dhammika, 2006. "Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 145-179, January.
    2. Chen, Shuping & Chen, Xia & Cheng, Qiang & Shevlin, Terry, 2010. "Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 41-61, January.
    3. Slemrod, Joel, 2004. "The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 57(4), pages 877-899, December.
    4. Zimmerman, Jerold L., 1983. "Taxes and firm size," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 119-149, April.
    5. repec:bla:jfinan:v:58:y:2003:i:3:p:1301-1327 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    7. Kong-Pin Chen & C.Y. Cyrus Chu, 2005. "Internal Control vs. External Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(4), pages 151-164, Winter.
    8. Desai, Mihir A. & Dyck, Alexander & Zingales, Luigi, 2007. "Theft and taxes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 591-623, June.
    9. Graham, John R. & Tucker, Alan L., 2006. "Tax shelters and corporate debt policy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 563-594, September.
    10. Mills, LF, 1998. "Book-tax differences and internal revenue service adjustments," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 343-356.
    11. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    12. Crocker, Keith J. & Slemrod, Joel, 2005. "Corporate tax evasion with agency costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1593-1610, September.
    13. Hanlon, Michelle & Heitzman, Shane, 2010. "A review of tax research," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 127-178, December.
    14. Sonja Olhoft Rego & Ryan Wilson, 2012. "Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 775-810, June.
    15. Mitchell A. Petersen, 2009. "Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(1), pages 435-480, January.
    16. Desai, Mihir A. & Dharmapala, Dhammika, 2009. "Earnings Management, Corporate Tax Shelters, and Book–Tax Alignment," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 62(1), pages 169-186, March.
    17. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bradshaw, Mark & Liao, Guanmin & Ma, Mark (Shuai), 2019. "Agency costs and tax planning when the government is a major Shareholder," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 255-277.
    2. Chyz, James A. & Ching Leung, Winnie Siu & Zhen Li, Oliver & Meng Rui, Oliver, 2013. "Labor unions and tax aggressiveness," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 675-698.
    3. Kim, Jeong-Bon & Li, Yinghua & Zhang, Liandong, 2011. "Corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk: Firm-level analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(3), pages 639-662, June.
    4. Hanlon, Michelle & Heitzman, Shane, 2010. "A review of tax research," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2-3), pages 127-178, December.
    5. Simon Loretz & Padraig Moore, 2013. "Corporate tax competition between firms," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(5), pages 725-752, October.
    6. Fangjun Wang & Shuolei Xu & Junqin Sun & Charles P. Cullinan, 2020. "Corporate Tax Avoidance: A Literature Review And Research Agenda," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(4), pages 793-811, September.
    7. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Blouin, Jennifer L. & Jagolinzer, Alan D. & Larcker, David F., 2015. "Corporate governance, incentives, and tax avoidance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 1-17.
    8. Ke Na & Wenjia Yan, 2022. "Languages and corporate tax avoidance," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 148-184, March.
    9. Chii-Shyan Kuo, 2022. "Family firms, tax avoidance, and socioemotional wealth: evidence from tax reform in Taiwan," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 58(4), pages 1535-1572, May.
    10. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Blouin, Jennifer L. & Larcker, David F., 2012. "The incentives for tax planning," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 391-411.
    11. Armstrong, Christopher S. & Blouin, Jennifer L. & Jagolinzer, Alan D. & Larcker, David F., 2015. "Corporate Governance, Incentives, and Tax Avoidance," Research Papers 2134, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    12. Martin Jacob & Anna Rohlfing-Bastian & Kai Sandner, 2021. "Why do not all firms engage in tax avoidance?," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 459-495, February.
    13. Kelvin K. F. Law & Lillian F. Mills, 2017. "Military experience and corporate tax avoidance," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 141-184, March.
    14. Dhawan, Anirudh & Ma, Liangbo & Kim, Maria H., 2020. "Effect of corporate tax avoidance activities on firm bankruptcy risk," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2).
    15. Diego Ravenda & Josep Argilés-Bosch & Maika Valencia-Silva, 2015. "Labor Tax Avoidance and Its Determinants: The Case of Mafia Firms in Italy," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 41-62, November.
    16. Kovermann, Jost & Wendt, Martin, 2019. "Tax avoidance in family firms: Evidence from large private firms," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 145-157.
    17. Wei Huang & Tingting Ying & Yun Shen, 2018. "Executive cash compensation and tax aggressiveness of Chinese firms," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 51(4), pages 1151-1180, November.
    18. Akhtar, Shumi & Akhtar, Farida & John, Kose & Wong, Su-Wen, 2019. "Multinationals' tax evasion: A financial and governance perspective," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 35-62.
    19. Ziqi Gao & Louise Yi Lu & Yangxin Yu, 2019. "Local Social Environment, Firm Tax Policy, and Firm Characteristics," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 158(2), pages 487-506, August.
    20. Dyreng, Scott D. & Hanlon, Michelle & Maydew, Edward L. & Thornock, Jacob R., 2017. "Changes in corporate effective tax rates over the past 25 years," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(3), pages 441-463.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    unikanie opodatkowania; firmy rodzinne; problemy agencji;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sgh:gosnar:y:2015:i:2:p:79-111. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Grzegorz Konat (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sgwawpl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.