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О теории контрактов (о Нобелевских премиях по экономике) // About the Contract Theory (about Nobel Prizes on Economy)

Author

Listed:
  • Ju. Voronov P.

    (Russian Academy of Science, director of the company “Case”)

  • Ю. Воронов П.

    (директор компании «Корпус»)

Abstract

The article - is description of Nobel prizes on economy. Nobel Prize in Economics “For the development of the theory of contracts” went to American professors Oliver Hart and Bengt Hallstrom. O. Hart was born in the UK, Swede B. Holmstrom - in Finland. Nevertheless, the history of the two laureates has more to do with the United States than with the historical homeland. Short CV of winners are presented, and summary of contract theory is described. Particular emphasis has been placed on agents opportunistic behavior and on winners works on soviet economic reforms of 1960’s years. Статья посвящена Нобелевским премиям по экономике. За 2016 г. Нобелевскую премию по экономике за разработку теории контрактов получили американские профессора Оливер Харт и Бенгт Хольстрем. О. Харт родился в Великобритании, швед Б. Хольмстром - в Финляндии. Тем не менее история обоих лауреатов больше связана с Соединенными Штатами, чем с исторической Родиной. Даны краткая биография лауреатов и характеристика теории контрактов. Особенное внимание уделено недостойному поведению агентов, а также работам лауреатов по анализу советских хозяйственных реформ 60-х гг. ХХ в.

Suggested Citation

  • Ju. Voronov P. & Ю. Воронов П., 2017. "О теории контрактов (о Нобелевских премиях по экономике) // About the Contract Theory (about Nobel Prizes on Economy)," Мир новой экономики // The world of new economy, Финансовый университет при Правительстве Российской Федерации // Financial University under The Governtment оf The Russian Federation, issue 1, pages 92-102.
    • Handle: RePEc:scn:wnewec:y:2017:i:1:p:92-102
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    2. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    3. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2008. "Contracts as Reference Points," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 1-48.
    4. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520.
    5. Williamson, Oliver E, 1971. "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(2), pages 112-123, May.
    6. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    7. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    8. Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2011. "Contracts as Reference Points--Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 493-525, April.
    9. Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2008. "Contracts as reference points � experimental evidence," IEW - Working Papers 393, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
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