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Эмпирический анализ дивидендной политики государственных и частных компаний в России // Empirical analysis of Dividend Policy of Public and Private Companies in Russia

Author

Listed:
  • A. Novak E.

    (National Research university Higher School of Economics, Nizhny Novgorod)

  • O. Silkina S.

    (National Research university Higher School of Economics, Nizhny Novgorod)

  • I. Khvostova E.

    (National Research university Higher School of Economics, Nizhny Novgorod)

  • А. Новак Е.

    (Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики», Нижний Новгород)

  • О. Силкина С.

    (Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики», Нижний Новгород)

  • И. Хвостова Е.

    (Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики», Нижний Новгород)

Abstract

The ownership structure of large Russian companies is characterized by a high share of state participation, but the relationship of dividend policy with the ownership structure (public or private) is not defned. Statistical analysis of the Russian companies shows that this relationship exists and can be nonlinear. In the course of the regression analysis, the authors tested hypotheses about the existence of a negative relationship between the volume of dividends paid and the share of state participation. We use panel data from nonfnancial companies listed in the Moscow stock exchange from 2008 to 2016, who paid dividends during this period; 150 companies in total. Three specifcations were tested: the frst one uses the dividend payout ratio as a dependent variable; the second — the share of dividends in the free cash flow; the third has a quadratic form — the nonlinear dependence of dividend payout ratio and share of state participation. Control variables were based on life cycle theory. Testing has shown that in the linear form there is no statistically signifcant relationship between the indicators of dividend payouts and the share of state participation. We have shown that the relationship between the dividend payout ratio and the share of government participation is non-linear and has the form of an inverted u-shape parabola. For a low level of state participation the dependence is positive but for a high level of participation, it is negative. This result can be explained in the framework of the agency theory: a positive relationship indicates the use of dividend payouts to resolve the agency conflict; a negative — the concentration of money in the hands of managers due to minority shareholders weakness. Further development of the study may include the addition of institutional constraints to the model, as well as the expansion of the concept of the dividend policy outcome within the framework of the frm’s sustainable development theory. В управлении крупными российскими компаниями высока доля государственного участия, но при этом не определено влияние на дивидендную политику типа собственности (государственной или частной). Статистический анализ российских компаний показывает, что эта взаимосвязь может иметь нелинейный характер. В ходе регрессионного анализа протестированы гипотезы о существовании отрицательной связи размера выплат и доли государственного участия. В выборке представлены компании — плательщики дивидендов, акции которых котируются на Московской бирже с 2008 по 2016 г., сформирована панель для 150 компаний за 8 лет. Тестируются три спецификации: в первой используется коэффициент дивидендных выплат в качестве зависимой переменной, во второй — доля дивидендов в свободном денежном потоке, третья имеет квадратичную форму. Контрольные переменные основаны на теории жизненного цикла в определении дивидендной политики. Тестирование показало, что в линейной форме статистически значимой взаимосвязи между показателями дивидендных выплат и долей госучастия нет. Удалось доказать, что зависимость между коэффициентом дивидендных выплат и долей госучастия является нелинейной и имеет вид параболы с ветвями, направленными вниз. Для низкого уровня госучастия зависимость положительная, для высокого — отрицательная. Данный результат может быть объяснен в рамках агентской теории: положительная связь говорит об использовании дивидендных выплат для решения агентского конфликта, отрицательная — о концентрации денег в руках менеджеров в условиях отсутствия силы у миноритарных акционеров. Развитие исследования может быть связано с добавлением институциональных ограничений в модель, а также расширением понятия результата дивидендной политики в рамках теории устойчивого развития фирмы.

Suggested Citation

  • A. Novak E. & O. Silkina S. & I. Khvostova E. & А. Новак Е. & О. Силкина С. & И. Хвостова Е., 2018. "Эмпирический анализ дивидендной политики государственных и частных компаний в России // Empirical analysis of Dividend Policy of Public and Private Companies in Russia," Финансы: теория и практика/Finance: Theory and Practice // Finance: Theory and Practice, ФГОБУВО Финансовый университет при Правительстве Российской Федерации // Financial University under The Government of Russian Federation, vol. 22(5), pages 90-104.
  • Handle: RePEc:scn:financ:y:2018:i:5:p:90-104
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    References listed on IDEAS

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