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Вертикальные Межфирменные Взаимодействия С Управляемой Надбавкой К Затратам

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  • Плещинский А.С.

Abstract

Предложен механизм транзакций между вертикально связанными фирмами с контролируемой ценовой надбавкой, которая определяется коэффициентом маржинализации, равным отношению цены продукта к средним издержкам поставщика. Разработаны модели и уравнения равновесия вертикальных олигополий до интеграции производителей промежуточного и конечного продукта и в результате применения контрактной формы сделок между предприятиями по цене ниже рыночной и наличия компенсирующего трансферта, выплачиваемого производителем конечного продукта. Определены нижняя и верхняя границы коэффициента маржинализации, при уменьшении которого в этом интервале прибыль каждой фирмы, применяющей предложенную форму взаимодействия, синергетический эффект и выгода потребителей возрастают от значений, соответствующих отсутствию вертикального контроля, до максимальных величин, достигаемых в случае создания поставщиком и потребителем интегрированной фирмы.

Suggested Citation

  • Плещинский А.С., 2014. "Вертикальные Межфирменные Взаимодействия С Управляемой Надбавкой К Затратам," Журнал Экономика и математические методы (ЭММ), Центральный Экономико-Математический Институт (ЦЭМИ), vol. 50(4), pages 112-133, октябрь.
    • Handle: RePEc:scn:cememm:v:50:y:2014:i:4:p:112-133
    Note: Москва
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Szidarovszky, F & Yakowitz, S, 1977. "A New Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness of the Cournot Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 18(3), pages 787-789, October.
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