Random Deviations Improve Micro–Macro Predictions: An Empirical Test
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DOI: 10.1177/0049124117729708
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Keywords
randomness; noise; micro–macro problem; experiment; evolutionary game; theory; formal modeling; coordination game; network;All these keywords.
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