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Deformations in Economic Consciousness of Children Raised in Orphanages

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  • Elena Valerievna Golubeva
  • Irina Valerievna Golubeva

Abstract

The aim of the present work was to study the deformations of economic consciousness in adolescents raised in orphanages. It was found that, due to deprivation of economic and social experience, children who were raised in orphanages have a high risk of deformations in economic consciousness, which can be represented by delayed formation of economic consciousness components in comparison with age norm, or distorted contents of economic consciousness components incompatible with social norms. The findings showed that the deformations of economic consciousness in adolescents raised in orphanages are deformation of the cognitive component—underforming of most economic concepts; deformation of the motivational-value component—corresponding to a lower (pre-conventional) level of moral consciousness; and deformation of the behavioral component—corresponding to Homo Economicus type, which seeks to maximize self-interest.

Suggested Citation

  • Elena Valerievna Golubeva & Irina Valerievna Golubeva, 2015. "Deformations in Economic Consciousness of Children Raised in Orphanages," SAGE Open, , vol. 5(3), pages 21582440156, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:sagope:v:5:y:2015:i:3:p:2158244015604191
    DOI: 10.1177/2158244015604191
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bettmann, Joanna E. & Mortensen, Jamie M. & Akuoko, Kofi O., 2015. "Orphanage caregivers' perceptions of children's emotional needs," Children and Youth Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 71-79.
    2. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
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