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Technical Change and the Evolution of Class Conscious Norms

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  • Peter Hans Matthews

    (Department of Economics, Middlebury College, Middlebury VT 05753 peter.h.matthews@middlebury.edu)

Abstract

Using a variant of the Michl-Baldani (2000) model of technical change as a strategic choice, this paper describes alternative foundations for the achievement of "positive class consciousness." The first is based on the Folk Theorem(s) of repeated games, while the second views the robust establishment of certain norms as the prerequisite for such conciousness.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Hans Matthews, 2000. "Technical Change and the Evolution of Class Conscious Norms," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 32(3), pages 470-481, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:reorpe:v:32:y:2000:i:3:p:470-481
    DOI: 10.1177/048661340003200312
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jeffrey Baldani & Thomas R. Michl, 2000. "Technical Change and Profits: The Prisoner's Dilemma," Review of Radical Political Economics, Union for Radical Political Economics, vol. 32(1), pages 104-118, March.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-788, September.
    4. Sethi, Rajiv, 1996. "Evolutionary stability and social norms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 113-140, January.
    5. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-922, July.
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