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Processes of Collective Political Action

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  • KARL-DIETER OPP

    (University of Hamburg)

Abstract

This article presents a new model that explains how collective political action develops over time under different structural conditions and given institutional settings. Two kinds of actors are distinguished: (a) The representatives of the state are endowed with the power to provide a certain public good and to impose costs on citizens by means of repressive action. The state's representatives aim at gaining a certain amount of support from the citizens and regard collective political action as a disturbance of their activities. (b) Citizens use collective political action to pressure the state to provide a public good. Each citizen is faced with specific incentives for collective political action. Proceeding from certain distributions of the incentives in a collective, processes of collective political action are evoked by a critical event (e.g., a nuclear reactor incident). Computer simulations are used to explore the implications of the model for three generated data sets. In a normal and a rectangular distribution, initial collective political action decreases so that the public good is not provided. Only in a u-shaped distribution does a large extent of collective political action emerge so that a partial provision of the public good ensues.

Suggested Citation

  • Karl-Dieter Opp, 1991. "Processes of Collective Political Action," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(2), pages 215-251, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:3:y:1991:i:2:p:215-251
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463191003002005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Riker, William H. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1968. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 25-42, March.
    2. Opp, Karl-Dieter, 1986. "Soft Incentives and Collective Action: Participation in the Anti-Nuclear Movement," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(1), pages 87-112, January.
    3. Finkel, Steven E. & Muller, Edward N. & Opp, Karl-Dieter, 1989. "Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 885-903, September.
    4. James W. White, 1988. "Rational Rioters: Leaders, Followers, and Popular Protest in Early Modern Japan," Politics & Society, , vol. 16(1), pages 35-69, March.
    5. Riker, William H. & Ordeshook, Peter C., 1968. "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 62(1), pages 25-42, March.
    6. Muller, Edward N. & Opp, Karl-Dieter, 1986. "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(2), pages 471-487, June.
    7. Muller, Edward N. & Seligson, Mitchell A., 1987. "Inequality and Insurgency," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(2), pages 425-451, June.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2013. "It’s the weather, stupid! Individual participation in collective May Day demonstrations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 251-271, June.

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